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1 Introduction
One of the most complicated and controversial questions in contemporary
South African legal theory
1
is whether (and how, and why) constitutional
provisions Ð particularly the rights provisions in the bill of rights
2
Ð can
and should permeate (or affect the development of) private law.
3
In one sense,
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1
See n 11 below. I use the term ``legal theory'' here to refer to one area of legal theory only, namely
legal thinking about the effects of the new constitutional order, and specifically the bill of rights,
on private law (see n 2 below), although other aspects of legal theory inevitably enter into the
discussion (see text surrounding n 4 and n 5 below).
2
As will appear from the discussion below it is unnecessarily restrictive to discuss this issue only
with reference to the bill of rights, as other constitutional provisions can also have an effect on
private law. However, the effect of the bill of rights is most directly visible and therefore of more
obvious importance.
3
Defining the problem accurately is difficult. As will appear from the discussion below, describing
it purely in terms of the horisontal application of fundamental rights is unnecessarily restrictive
for various reasons. Even though I am focusing my attention here on the effect of the constitution
on private law, discussing the problem in terms of the effect of the constitution on private law can
be too restrictive as well, because the same arguments apply to the effect of the constitution in
criminal or labour law. The problem is characterised vividly in the title of a German source that I
refer to extensively in part 2 of this article : Ruffert Vorrang der Verfassung und Eigensta
È
ndigkeit
des Privatrechts: Eine verfassungsrechtliche Untersuchung zur Privatrechtswirkung des Grundge-
setzes (2001). As Ruffert's analysis and the rest of this article indicate, this problem is much larger
than the relative temporal priority or rank of legislation vis-a
Á
-vis the constitution Ð Ruffert 26
refers to it as a ``grand the
Á
me'' of contemporary German constitutional theory. For the moment I
am leaving the exact nature of the effects that the constitution might have in private law open,
but they could include: (a) possible private-law side-effects of ``normal'' defensive enforcement of
fundamental rights against the state; (b) private-law effects of direct and (different kinds of)
indirect horisontal enforcement of fundamental rights; (c) amendment of private-law rules caused
or inspired by the fundamental-rights and other constitutional provisions; and (d) constitutional
enforcement of so-called protective duties of the state towards private interests. These aspects are
explained and analysed further below.
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this may seem like just another instance of the old problem of properly articu-
lating the relationship between public law and private law, but I intend to
analyze the problem with reference to the more problematic, dynamic
4
aspira-
tions of what Klare calls ``transformative constitutionalism''. In what has
become an influential article in South African legal discourse,
5
Klare described
transformative constitutionalism as ``a long-term project of constitutional en-
actment, interpretation, and enforcement committed . . . to transforming a
country's political and social institutions and power relationships in a demo-
cratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction.''
6
In this context, the project of
defining the effect of the constitution on private law assumes urgency and
significance beyond traditional (spatially conceived)
7
debates about the ``pro-
per'' relationship between public and private law. In what follows I will analyse
the effect of the constitution on private law from Klare's dynamic perspective
of transformative constitutionalism, and therefore a few introductory remarks
4
In this article the relationship between public and private law is considered in what Schlag
``Rights in the postmodern condition'' in Sarat and Kearns Legal Rights: Historical and
Philosophical Perspectives (1996) 263 267-270 describes as the ``instrumentalist'' Ð as opposed to
the ``analytic'' Ð aesthetic of law. The analytic aesthetic ``enacts a rhetoric of order'' in which
concepts are ordered according to their proper place and spatial relationships between them; the
instrumentalist aesthetic presents rights as ``energy sources'' that inspire or motivate change and
reform. As Schlag points out (eg 294-300), the instrumentalization of rights rhetoric means that
change, progress or reform is implicitly preferred to order, stability and certainty. The dynamic
or instrumental notion of constitutionalism is obviously more problematic, as is illustrated by
Klare ``Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism'' 1998 SAJHR 146-188. See further on
the metaphoric stability of private law in the analytic aesthetic and the dynamic function of
public law Botha ``Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism'' 2002 TSAR 612
627 n 71.
5
The term ``transformative constitutionalism'' was used by Klare (n 4) to describe the aspirational
aspect of the new South African constitutional order, which is still shaped very strongly by the
remnants of a fundamentally conservative legal culture. Like some of my colleagues, I am
attempting here to substantiate a positive response to Klare's question whether transformative
constitutionalism is a viable project for South Africa. For South African publications inspired by
Klare's notion of transformative constitutionalism see especially Botha ``Metaphoric reasoning
and transformative constitutionalism'' 2002 TSAR 612-627; 2003 TSAR 20-36; Moseneke ``The
fourth Bram Fischer memorial lecture: transformative adjudication'' 2002 SAJHR 309-319;
Botha ``Freedom and constraint in constitutional adjudication'' 2004 SAJHR 249-283; and
further Currie ``Judicious avoidance'' 1999 SAJHR 138 152; Osborne and Sprigman ``Behold:
angry native becomes postmodernist prophet of judicial Messiah'' 2001 SALJ 693 699; De Vos
``A bridge too far? History as context in the interpretation of the South African constitution''
2001 SAJHR 1 2; De Vos ``Grootboom, the right of access to housing and substantive equality as
contextual fairness'' 2001 SAJHR 258 260; Bilchitz ``Giving socio-economic rights teeth: the
minimum core and its importance'' 2002 SALJ 484 486; Du Plessis ``Between apology and utopia
Ð the constitutional court and public opinion'' 2002 SAJHR 1 9. In addition to the introductory
remarks below, I return to the notion of transformative constitutionalism in the South African
context in the final section of the article (part 2).
6
Klare (n 4) 150. See the concluding section of the article for further discussion of Klare's notion
of transformative constitutionalism (part 2).
7
in Schlag's terminology (n 4). In simplified terms, one could say that private law and public law
would, in the analytic aesthetic, represent two spatially differentiated and related entities or
fields, whereas the instrumentalist aesthetic would present them as two parts or aspects of a
dynamic process of change. In the former aesthetic, the theme of this article assumes the nature of
a ``border dispute'', in the latter it acquires a more complex and problematic character involving
tension and movement between two imperfectly distinguished aspects of a single process. It
would be foolish to claim that the instrumentalist aesthetic is a perfect or the best paradigm for
discussing the effect of the constitution on private law, but for the purpose it is clearly less
restrictive than the analytic alternative.
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are necessary to sketch out some of my assumptions and hypotheses about the
dynamics of legal change in the South African context.
When the new South African constitution explicitly declared itself the su-
preme law of the land
8
and granted the courts the power of constitutional
review
9
it created a new adjudicative dilemma of simultaneously upholding
the supremacy of the new constitution and the integrity of a well-developed
and established system of private law.
10
In the transformative context of the
new South African democracy constitutional supremacy was implemented
against the background of a history characterised by inequality and injustice,
and the constitution must be seen as an explicit attempt to transform legal and
social institutions and power relationships towards greater equality and justice.
Although the tension between constitutional supremacy and the integrity of
private law also attracts attention in other legal systems,
11
the historical, social
and political context against which this issue features in South Africa is parti-
cularly important. The configuration of a new supreme constitution, judicial
power of constitutional review and a strong moral and political impulse to-
8
s 2: ``This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is
invalid, and the duties imposed by it must be performed.'' See further s 7, 8, 38, 39.
9
s 172(1): when deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court must declare that a law
or conduct that is inconsistent with the constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency,
and make any order that is just and equitable, including an order that limits the restrospectivity
of the declaration of invalidity and an order to suspend the declaration of invalidity for a period
to allow correction.
10
South African private law consists of a mixture of largely uncodified common law (of mixed
Roman-Dutch and Anglo origin) and ad hoc legislation; see Zimmermann and Visser
``Introduction: South African law as a mixed legal system'' in Zimmermann and Visser (eds)
Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 1-30. Constitutional review
affects pre-existing legislation, new legislation and also uncodified common law (because all law
is subject to the constitution: s 2; and the bill of rights binds the legislature, the executive and the
judiciary and ``applies to all law'': s 8(1)). As will appear from the discussion below, the issue is
arguably less controversial with regard to private law legislation created subsequent to the
constitutional provisions in question, because in such a case it is ``normal'' that later law has to
conform to pre-existing (not to mention superior) law, and it is also less likely that legislation
will be promulgated that is fundamentally in conflict with the spirit of the new constitutional
order. Moreover, newly conceived, ordinary legislation is easier to subject to constitutional
control and amendment than is the case with ancient common-law principles. However, as will
appear from the examples discussed below, even ostensibly less controversial new legislation
creates some problems because smaller conflicts between the constitution and private law
legislation will still occur.
11
As will appear from section 3 below this problem has been a prominent issue in South African
constitutional theory since about 1990, and as appears from sections 5 and 6 it has enjoyed
considerable theoretical attention in German constitutional law and in international law for at
least three decades. Generally speaking, American law does not distinguish between private law
and public law as sharply, and the application question assumes a different form because of the
state action doctrine; see generally Tribe American Constitutional Law (1988) 1688-1720. For
various reasons similar or related issues have also emerged in Dutch literature (see Van Maanen
``De onrechtmatige rechtmatige overheidsdaad bij de burgerlijke rechter: Zoektocht naar de
kwadratuur van de cirkel'' in Hoitink, Van Maanen, Van Ravels and Schueler Schadevergoeding
bij Rechtmatige Overheidsdaad (2002) 7-89; Smits ``Constitutionalisering van het vermogens-
recht'' in Preadviezen voor de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking (2003) 1-163),
English (see MacQueen ``Delict, contract, and the bill of rights: A perspective from the United
Kingdom'' 2004 SALJ 359-394) and Scots (see Boyle, Himsworth, Loux and MacQueen (eds)
Human Rights and Scots Law (2002)) recently; and see further Friedmann and Barak-Erez (eds)
Human Rights in Private Law (2001). Parts of the problem relate back to older debates in English
and American theoretical literature. For reasons of space and time I will not discuss the Dutch,
English and Scottish debates here.
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wards social and legal transformation inevitably means that all legislative,
executive and judicial activity
12
takes place in terms of a set of moral and
political judgments regarding the abolition or reform of what is perceived as
having been wrong in the past and the promotion and development of what is
considered right for the future.
13
In such a constitutionally driven transforma-
tive context, reform and development often involves more than the ``normal''
tension between the stabilising tendency of existing law and the urge to adapt,
renew and develop the law
14
Ð the morally justified and constitutionally en-
trenched privileging of transformation entails what may be perceived as a
12
Although I will point out that this problem involves and affects legislative, administrative and
judicial powers, judicial lawmaking features prominently in the literature on this issue because of
the critical implications of constitutional review and the countermajoritarian dilemma. Klare (n
4) 146-188 pays special attention to judicial lawmaking and answers some of the questions raised
by the majoritarian theory. The best recent South African discussion of the countermajoritarian
dilemma is that of Botha ``Democracy and rights: constitutional interpretation in a postrealist
world'' 2000 THRHR 561-581.
13
On the dynamic of transformation and its rhetorical codes see Van der Walt ``Dancing with
codes Ð protecting, developing, limiting and deconstructing property rights in the constitutional
state'' 2001 SALJ 258-311. For an illuminating analysis of the adjudicative issues surrounding
transformation see Botha ``Freedom and constraint'' (n 5) 249-283.
14
The dynamic that I describe here (existing private law stabilising the status quo and resisting
change) is neither inevitable nor universal, but it seems to be a reasonable explanation of the
current South African situation. Klare (n 4) 146-151 recognises the tension between democratic
lawmaking and transformative adjudication; at 166-172 he identifies the ``disconnect'' between
the transformative aspirations and potential of the South African constitution and the pervasive
conservatism of SouthAfrican legal culture as amajor source of potential conflict in the project of
transformative constitutionalism. See further along the same lines Van derWalt ``Property theory
and the transformation of property law'' in Cooke (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law (2005)
361-380. For examples that contradict the dynamic of reformist constitution and reactionary
private law see Van der Walt ``Tentative urgency: Sensitivity for the paradoxes of stability and
change in social transformation decisions of the constitutional court'' 2001 SAPL 1-27. Of course,
in the course of time the constitution itself could become an instrument of resistance against
change and transformation, while private law could become an instrument of reform and change.
I am indebted to Michael Sachs for alerting me to the following two examples from German law.
The first example illustrates how private law could be developed to effect reform with reference to
the constitution despite failure of the legislature to develop new law. When certain laws were
declared unconstitutional for allowing sex discrimination in 1949, the German legislature was
given four years to amend them or produce new laws that conform to the constitutional principle
of non-discrimination.When it appeared that new laws had not been prepared after four years the
constitutional court refused to allow an extension and all existing laws became invalid at once (see
BVerfGE 3, 225), leaving a huge gap in private law that couldÐ at least for the meantimeÐ only
be filled through judicial activity. In the event, until new laws were eventually promulgated in
1958, the courts apparently did a reasonably good job developing new law with reference to
acceptable parts of old law and the equality provisions in the constitution. The second example
involves a case where legislative development was easier than constitutional amendment, and the
constitution therefore could not drive social reforms. Because of the greater majority required for
constitutional amendment, recent changes in German law to permit formalised same-sex
partnerships were implemented by way of normal legislation when a proposed amendment to the
anti-discriminatory rule in a 3 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz Ð GG) failed. The new
private law legislation already survived a constitutional challenge based on the special protection
of marriage in a 6 GG: BVerfG, 1 BvF 1/01 of 17.7.2002, par 76-103 (at http://www.bverfg.de/).
This example indicates that the dynamic set out above is not self-evident, as is also illustrated by
the Indian experience with the constitutionalization of property. The Indian courts interpreted the
property clause in the new Indian constitution of 1950 in a reactionary rather than a reformist way
and struck down reformist legislation, causing interminable conflicts with the reform-oriented
government and ultimately resulting in the removal of the property clause from the Indian bill of
rights: see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 192-206
for an overview of the history and references.
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greater threat for the stability and integrity of existing law and for legal cer-
tainty than in ``normal'' situations.
15
Or, in another perspective, moral and
political aspirations towards all-embracing or at least wide-ranging political,
social and legal transformation highlight the tension between constitutional
reform and the potentially reactionary tendency of existing law more acutely
than may otherwise be the case.
16
Since the drafting phases that produced the 1993 interim constitution and
the 1996 constitution South African lawyers have struggled with this dilemma,
and a variety of theoretical explanations and positions have emerged to explain
the application and enforcement of the constitution and its effect on or in
private law. As the overview will show, much of the initial debate has concen-
trated on the notion of (direct or indirect) horisontal application and enforce-
ment of the constitution. Some of the early debates and the positions developed
and adopted in them are discussed in sections 2 and 3 below. However, in more
recent cases and academic literature the notion of the state's duty to protect
fundamental rights has been raised as an alternative discursive framework for
this debate. Whereas the early discussion about horisontal application relied at
least partly on German law, the recent discussion about the state's duty to
15
In one sense, the difference between ``normal'' or doctrinal development and the transformative
development I have in mind here can be compared to the difference between normal scientific
development and a paradigm shift as described by Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(1962) 52: even ``normal'' scientific or doctrinal development (what private law specialists
sometimes refer to as interstitial development, ie step-by-step development that fills up gaps on a
case by case basis, based on the work of Hart The Concept of Law (1961) 37-38) involves some
change and therefore resistance. Large-scale transformation, on the other hand, requires a
fundamental rethinking of the whole paradigm or framework within which all development
takes place, and it may therefore imply at least some larger changes as well, even though it does
not necessarily mean that everything needs to change or that everything will change radically.
However, it may be assumed that resistance against framework changes will be stronger than in
the case of doctrinal change and, more pertinently, resistance against framework change often
assumes the form of presenting it as (less threatening) doctrinal change. For arguments
favouring the interstitial approach to development of private law see Van Aswegen ``Policy
considerations in the law of delict'' 1993 THRHR 171-195; for a more nuanced approach see
Lubbe ``Taking fundamental rights seriously: the bill of rights and its implications for the
development of contract law'' 2004 SALJ 395-423. For an incisive discussion of approaches to
constitutional adjudication and a critique of the interstitial approach see Botha ``Freedom and
constraint'' (n 5) 249-283.
16
These introductory remarks are inevitably general, but in the rest of the article they are
contextualised around the promulgation of the new South African constitutions of 1993 and
1996. What I want to underline for the moment is that the normal tension between stability and
change is intensified by the fact that Ð in the context of transformative constitutionalism as
described earlier Ð the South African constitution is explicitly aimed at reformist or
transformative aspirations, while private law (especially in the absence of a civil code) consists
of relatively old received rules, principles and institutions (including some older private-law
legislation). If one assumes that existing legislation was, with the advent of the new
constitutional era, overhauled and ``cleansed'' of whatever constituted the statutory aspects of
the old, unequal and unjust regime, uncodified private law remains the only obvious remnant of
the old order, which could create the impression that it alone embodies the stabilizing, change-
resistant legacy of the past. This could create the impression that private law has to be abolished
or changed drastically to promote the transformative process. However, this is clearly an
oversimplified and misleading perspective on the dynamics of legal change; see Van der Walt (n
13) 258-311 for a broad discussion. The tension between the integrity and certainty of existing
law and transformation is nevertheless intensified because of the moral and political impulse
behind large-scale transformation.
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protect fundamental rights relies exclusively on international law although,
interestingly, German constitutional law also witnessed a development from
horisontal application to protective state duties discourse in explaining the
effect of the constitution on private law. My purpose in this article is to analyse
the theoretical background of these older and more recent notions in terms of
which transformation is explained in South African law, the differences be-
tween them and the pros and cons of referring to them in the context of the
South African constitution and its effect on private law. For the purpose of
evaluating these notions I refer to comparative sources in sections 4 and 5
below before discussing their merit and application in South African law in
section 6.
2 The South African application debate in academic literature
2.1 Introduction
From the very beginning, the application issue was a crucial part of the South
African debate about the implementation of the fundamental rights in the new
constitution.
17
The early debate was dominated by two central arguments, both
of which acknowledged that the spirit and values of the new constitution had to
be reflected and promoted in private law. However, the two main arguments
differed sharply on the best way to realise this goal.
The weak application argument assumed as its point of departure that the
spirit and values of the new democratic constitution were basically similar to
the ``inherent'' values of private law in its ``original'' Roman-Dutch form,
untainted by apartheid. According to this argument the best way to proceed
Ð once apartheid legislation has been abolished Ð was to allow private law to
develop in its own way and according to its own inherent value system and
doctrinal logic. The assumption was that, eventually, this would produce re-
sults substantively similar to those foreseen by the constitution. However, to
``colonise'' private law by enforcing constitutional values and methods directly,
``from outside'', would be both unhelpful and unnecessary, and therefore any
form of horisontal application beyond indirect and weak ``seepage'' of general
principles would be a grave mistake. Of course there are shades of opinion
within the group of academics who argued that private law should be allowed
to develop on its own, ranging from the view that there is a completely private
sphere where law (including the bill of rights) does not penetrate;
18
through the
more moderate argument that direct horisontal application amounts to unwar-
17
Some authors merely stated what they perceived to be the correct textual interpretation of the
constitutional provisions regarding application (eg Wolhuter ``Horisontality in the interim and
final constitutions'' 1996 SAPL 512-527 agrees with the majority decision in Du Plessis v De
Klerk 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC) that the 1993 interim constitution applied indirectly to the
horisontal relationship between private persons, and points out that the text of the 1996
constitution continues to support indirect horisontal application while also making room for
direct horisontal application in certain cases), while others adopted a more principled stance on
the necessity for and possible effects of horisontal application. In what follows I concentrate on
the latter group.
18
See eg Van der Vyver ``The private sphere in constitutional litigation'' 1994 THRHR 360-395.
Van der Vyver's arguments are based on a textual interpretation of the 1993 interim
constitution. He argues that, according to the text, the bill of rights does not apply to non-state
law (internal affairs of non-state institutions), although it ``may have an indirect effect'' on those
affairs, especially as far as non-discrimination is concerned (s 33(4) of the 1993 constitution).
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ranted ``colonisation'' or ``invasion'' of private law;
19
to the fairly widespread
attitude that private law could be subject to changes inspired by the constitu-
tion, but that those changes should preferably be implemented through legisla-
tion; while judicial intervention, when it cannot be avoided, should be
restricted to small-scale, ``interstitial'' or step-by-step development of private
law according to its own inherent logic.
20
In all its different shades, this weak
application argument was by and large against the so-called horisontal appli-
cation of the bill of rights.
The stronger application argument assumed that the constitution must have
a more direct, fundamental effect on private law and that private law cannot
simply be left to gradually ``regain'' its inherent virtues according to its own
inherent logic. In one way or another, this argument was initially expressed in
arguments that favoured direct horisontal application of the fundamental
rights in the constitution. Since the pro-horisontality arguments have appar-
ently won the day, I will focus on them in the rest of this section and only refer
to the more conservative privatist arguments in so far as they are still relevant
to the discussion about the methodology of horisontal application.
19
Visser ``A successful constitutional invasion of private law'' 1995 THRHR 745 746: ``I[I]t spells
trouble for our legal system as a whole if a judge is actually empowered to change private law
almost at will''; ``[why should horisontal application not be followed] (at this rather
revolutionary stage in the history of our country and its legal system where almost anything
can be changed provided that one can somehow vaguely justify it by a reference to the injustices
of the past Ð regardless, of course, of the actual facts or the real merits of the intended change),
our private law had better prepare itself for drastic reconstructive surgery''. Interestingly, in
``Geen afsonderlike eis om 'grondwetlike skadevergoeding' nie'' 1996 THRHR 695-700 Visser
adopted a much more lenient attitude towards horisontal application, although such application
was not in issue in the case under discussion Ð the issue was the creation of a new remedy
(constitutional damages) under the influence of the constitution. At 698 Visser actually argues
that, whatever form horisontal application eventually assumes in South Africa, it would be
unacceptable not to protect fundamental rights against delicts between private persons. At 699-
700 he qualifies this statement and states that the South African law of delict is generally capable
of dealing with the demands of the new constitutional system, because it is a sophisticated
system that does not require radical change. Visser (''Horisontaliteit van fundamentele regte
afgewys'' 1996 THRHR 510-514) explains more clearly that he is against the more open-ended
interpretation that he associates with direct horisontal application, but he accepts a milder form
of indirect horisontal application as a suitable way of accommodating the promotion of
constitutional values while retaining the values of private law and its more rigorous
methodology. Van der Merwe ``Constitutional colonisation of the common law: A problem
of institutional integrity'' 2000 TSAR 12 14 also describes the ``constitutional way of thinking''
as harmful to the integrity of the common law and therefore in the long run harmful to the legal
system as a whole, and argues that necessary developments can best be achieved within the
institutional framework and methodology of private law itself. A recent publication in the same
spirit is Jordaan ``The constitution's impact on the law of contract in perspective'' 2004 De Jure
58-65. See Carpenter and Botha ``Constitutional attack on private law: Are the fears well
founded?'' 1996 THRHR 126-135 for a critique of the view expounded by Visser and Van der
Merwe.
20
See eg Van Aswegen (n 15) 171-195; Van Aswegen ``The implications of a bill of rights for the
law of contract and delict'' 1995 SAJHR 50-69; Van Aswegen ``The future of South African
contract law'' in Van Aswegen (ed) The Future of South African Private Law (1994) 44-60; Visser
``The future of the law of delict'' in Van Aswegen (ed) The Future of South African Private Law
(1994) 26-43. The latest publication in roughly this vein is Lubbe (n 15) 395-423, although his
argument is more nuanced and open to some direct constitutional influence in private law.
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2.2 Pro-horisontality arguments
Proponents of the view that the fundamental rights should apply horisontally
as well as vertically relied on the central argument that the new constitutional
order should not countenance the privatisation of inequality and discrimina-
tion.
21
From the beginning, pro-horisontality arguments focused on the need
to counter so-called privatised apartheid: although apartheid was institutiona-
lised in state policy and law during the pre-1994 era, discrimination and in-
justice were also entrenched by purely private practice that could continue
without the statutory support of apartheid legislation. If the fundamental
rights in the new constitution were only enforced vertically against the state,
private individuals and institutions would be able to continue the very same
discriminatory practices that were supposed to be proscribed by the constitu-
tion. The mere abolition of apartheid laws would therefore not eradicate apart-
heid injustices Ð proactive reform of private law is required. In order to
outlaw and uproot private discrimination and inequality, it is necessary that
the fundamental rights should be enforceable not only against the state but also
between private persons and against private institutions, and therefore the
constitution has to apply on the horisontal level as well as the purely state-
oriented vertical level.
22
Pro-horisontality theorists acknowledged that purely
21
This was the crux of many early pleas for horisontal application; see eg Sachs ``Towards a bill of
rights in a democratic South Africa'' 1990 SAJHR 1 3-4; Botha ``Privatism, authoritarianism
and the constitution: the case of Neethling and Potgieter'' 1995 THRHR 496-499; Du Plessis
``Enkele gedagtes oor historiese interpretasie van hoofstuk 3 van die oorgangsgrondwet'' 1995
THRHR 504-513; Van der Vyver ``Constitutional free speech and the law of defamation'' 1995
SALJ 572-602; Carpenter and Botha (n 19) 126-135; Mbao ``The province of the South African
bill of rights determined and redetermined Ð A comment on the case of Baloro v University of
Bophuthatswana'' 1996 SALJ 33-45; Woolman ``Defamation, application, and the interim
constitution: an unqualified and direct analysis of Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd'' 1996
SALJ 428-454; Van der Walt ``Justice Kriegler's disconcerting judgment in Du Plessis v De
Klerk: Much ado about direct horisontal application (read nothing)'' 1996 TSAR 732-741; Van
der Walt ``Perspectives on horisontal application: Du Plessis v De Klerk revisited'' 1997 SAPL 1-
31; Woolman and Davis ``The last laugh: Du Plessis v De Klerk, classical liberalism, creole
liberalism, and the application of fundamental rights under the interim and final constitutions''
1996 SAJHR 361-404; Cheadle and Davis ``The application of the 1996 constitution in the
private sphere'' 1997 SAJHR 44-66; Rautenbach ``The bill of rights applies to private law and
binds private persons'' 2000 TSAR 296-316; Van der Walt ``Die toekoms van die onderskeid
tussen die publiekreg en die privaatreg in die lig van die horisontale werking van die grondwet''
2000 TSAR 416-427, 605-618 (also published, with a postscript and accompanied by a Dutch
and an English translation, the latter as: ``The future and futurity of the public-private
distinction in the view of the horisontal application of fundamental rights'' in Tangible mais
Intouchable, la Loi du Tact, la Loi de la Loi (2002) 101-147); and Woolman ``Application'' in
Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (Revision Service 3 1998).
22
Woolman ``Application'' (n 21) 10-1 points out that the dichotomy between vertical and
horisontal application of the bill of rights ``represented a vast oversimplification of the existing
range of possibilities'', by which he apparently means to suggest that the two should rather be
seen as points on a continuum, with many nuances in between. According to Woolman (10-1)
verticalists and horisontalists agree that: (a) statutes, when relied upon by the state, are subject
to constitutional review; (b) the common law, when relied upon by the state, is subject to
constitutional review; and (c) statutes, when relied upon by a private party, is subject to
constitutional review; so that the remaining issue is whether the common law, when relied upon
by a private party in a private dispute, is subject to constitutional review.
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textual arguments for horisontality were problematic because the text of the
1993 interim constitution was equivocal about the application issue, and even
though the 1996 final constitution seems to be much clearer in favour of
horisontality it could also support arguments against horisontality.
23
However,
they still insisted that horisontal application was a vital requirement for the
success of the transformative constitution. It could be said, therefore, that
arguments in favour of horisontal application were always backed up by the
aspirations of transformative constitutionalism:
24
the ideal of constitutional
23
See particularly Woolman ``Application'' (n 21) 10-11±10-18, 10-43±10-45; Woolman and Davis
(n 21) 361-404; Van der Walt ``Justice Kriegler's . . .'' (n 21) 732-741; Van der Walt
``Perspectives'' (n 21) 1-31 for nuanced arguments to that effect. In the 1993 interim constitution,
verticalists rely upon s 7(1), 7(2), 33(4) and 35(3) to support a purely vertical reading. S 7(1)
determines that ch 3 binds legislative and executive organs of state, but the judiciary is omitted,
creating the impression that private relations (primarily governed through the application and
development of the common law by the judiciary) were insulated from the effect of ch 3 on
purpose. Verticalists also read s 7(2) (ch 3 applies to all law) cumulatively with s 7(1), so that the
common law, relied upon by a private party in a private dispute, is not subject to constitutional
review. Horisontalists counter that s 7(1) and 7(2) can be read sequentially as well, which would
support an all-inclusive interpretation of s 7(2). Furthermore, verticalists argue that s 35(3) (in
the application and development of the common law the courts shall have due regard for the
spirit, purport and objects of ch 3) would have been redundant if ch 3 applied horisontally;
horisontalists argue that s 35(3) could be seen as a provision that merely ensures that all law is
subject to the indirect permeating influence of constitutional values, but that it does not
necessarily exclude direct horisontal application of the constitution. Similar arguments apply to
s 33(4) (ch 3 shall not preclude measures to prohibit unfair discrimination by bodies and persons
other than those bound by s 7(1)). In the 1996 constitution, the strongest textual support for a
horisontal reading is located in s 8. S 8(1) provides that the bill of rights applies to all law and
binds the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. S 8(2) provides that the bill of rights binds
all natural and juristic persons if (and to the extent that) it is applicable, taking into account the
nature of the right and any duty imposed by the right. S 8(3) provides that a court, in applying
the bill of rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of s 8(2), must apply (or where necessary
develop) the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to the right (and may
develop the common law to limit the right in accordance with s 36). According to Woolman
``Application'' (n 21) 10-61 s 39(2) (when developing the common law a court must promote the
spirit, purport and objects of the bill of rights) has the same function as the old s 35(3), namely
to ensure indirect horisontal seepage, but now the courts are obliged to ensure such seepage
(''must promote'' instead of just ``having due regard''). The significant point is that, although the
interim constitution seemed to support a vertical reading and the 1996 constitution seems to
support a horisontal reading, neither text supports a specific interpretation unequivocally.
24
As Woolman ``Application'' (n 21) 10-18 Ð 10-32, 10-45 Ð 10-49 usefully indicates, the main
non-textual reasons in support of the vertical approach were that: (a) the historical function of a
bill of rights is to provide vertical defensive rights against state power; (b) horisontal application
would introduce state coercion into the sphere of private autonomy; (c) horisontal application
leaves too much power in the hands of unelected judges; and (d) the judicial process is not suited
to the kind of decisions required by horisontality. Verticalists counter that: (a) the nature of state
power has changed since the 18th century and many of the abuses to be prevented by the bill of
rights are now committed by private power; (b) through legislation the state has exactly the same
kind of coercive influence in the private sphere as it would under horisontal application; (c)
constitutional review by unelected judges is still subject to legislative correction and has the
added advantage of acting as a constitutional check on legislative abuse; and (d) in developing
the common law the judges are doing roughly the same work as would be required by
constitutional review of the common law. See further Cheadle and Davis (n 21) 44-66.
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transformation demands that a ``purely private realm'' should not be isolated
from the transformative effect of the constitution and therefore authorises or
requires horisontal application.
25
Pro-horisontality theorists accepted that, once apartheid laws have been
abolished formally, most of the remaining transformation work would neces-
sarily have to be done through the promulgation of new laws and suitable
amendment of existing laws, but they also recognised that legislative activity
could probably not do everything and that at least some of this work would
have to be done through judicial development of the common law. Where the
development of the common law had to take place in the courts through
judicial interpretation and application of the constitution in private law, they
argued that the correct method of interpretation and application should
amount to horisontal application of the bill of rights, which means that the
fundamental rights provisions in the bill of rights could when necessary be
enforced Ð in some way or another Ð in what otherwise was a private law
dispute.
Pro-horisontality arguments concerned with the possibility that a ``purely
private sphere'' left unaffected by the constitution would frustrate the compre-
hensive eradication of apartheid and the effective implementation of the new
constitutional order initially favoured a strong version of horisontal applica-
tion, and in fact some of the most vocal supporters of horisontality argued in
25
Johan (JWG) van der Walt's publications on horisontal application should Ð together with
some of his other work seemingly unrelated to this topic Ð be read with an awareness of his own
rather unique theoretical agenda, which stretches well beyond narrow interpretation issues and
even beyond constitutional application as a more or less technical issue. In ``The future and
futurity of the public-private distinction'' (n 21) he explains at 102 that the horisontal
application of fundamental rights is ``historically the most recent and systematically the final
way in which the law can be revised in terms of the public interest'' in order to resist and
undermine the ``normative privatisation of the public''. At 110 he describes it (perhaps too
strongly) as ``the last straw as far as the collapse of the distinction between private and public
law is concerned''. In ``Progressive indirect horisontal application of the bill of rights: Towards a
co-operative relation between common-law and constitutional jurisprudence'' 2001 SAJHR 341-
363 this project is described as a call for progressive indirect horisontal application to indicate
that this approach should allow judges to give incisive effect to constitutional principles and
values without forfeiting the integrity of the common law system. In ``Blixen's difference:
horisontal application of fundamental rights and the resistance to neo-colonialism'' 2003 TSAR
311-331 Van der Walt characterises the same thought as resistance to feudal or neo-colonial
thinking, which is closely connected to what he earlier described as the conflation of economic
and political power or the normative privatisation of the political or the public. In the latter
article he characterises his project as a ``horisontalising call on government to justify action in
terms of public interest'', and he explains that this call involves both the vertical and the
horisontal levels on which law features. This line of argument infuses all his work on horisontal
application and a good deal besides; see eg ``Piracy, property and plurality: Re-reading the
foundations of modern law'' 2001 TSAR 524-547; ``The (im)possibility of two together when it
matters'' 2002 TSAR 462-477. For an interesting perspective on the philosophical background
of Van der Walt's work and related academic views see Le Roux Die Estetiese Republiek Ð
Kuns, Reg en Post-Liberale Politiek in Nietzsche, Arendt en Lyotard (2002 thesis UP) 1-8 (the
debate between liberalism and republicanism discussed in the context of constitutional
interpretation in South Africa).
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favour of direct horisontal application.
26
In his earliest publication on this
topic, Johan van der Walt explained this position with reference to the real
effect that the constitution would (or would not) have in a private law dispute:
``the major threat to the equal dignity of all South African citizens will come
from the continued exercise of liberties gained as a result of rights sanctioned
by the unjust laws of the past'', and not from the exercise of rights sanctioned
by law.
27
Since Van der Walt initially argued
28
that ``it is certainly not true that
all social relations are direct counterparts or concrete expressions of legal
rules'',
29
he was bound to conclude that those affected by exercises of power
that are not supported by legal rules could only be protected if the constitution
applied directly on the horisontal level, so that they could rely directly on the
constitution to found a cause of action for their attack on the other private
party. In other words, their concern for the availability of a viable cause of
action prompted horisontalists like Johan van der Walt to argue in favour of
direct horisontal application rather than just indirect horisontal application of
fundamental rights or, even more weakly, gradual and indirect ``seepage'' of
constitutional principles.
However, in a later publication Johan van der Walt revised his earlier posi-
tion and argued that indeed
30
``there is no `extra-legal' private sphere'',
31
and
that every social practice in fact in some way relies upon and is sanctioned by a
legal rule that can Ð in suitable circumstances Ð be subjected to constitutional
review. Accordingly, Van der Walt realised that ``the distinction between direct
and indirect horisontality is indeed of no real significance for the administra-
tion of justice under the Final Constitution''.
32
The only real application issue
26
Johan van der Walt initially forwarded the strongest argument to the effect that we need not
only horisontal, but direct horisontal application of the bill of rights, until he changed his mind
and conceded that the difference between direct and indirect horisontality was indeed largely
meaningless; see the sources cited in n 21, 23, 25 above and 36 below. Woolman (see the sources
cited in n 21 and 23 above) seems to argue for direct horisontal application as first prize, but he
is not absolutely clear on the matter. The same applies to Rautenbach (n 21) 296-316. Others
such as Van der Walt and Woolman allow for different forms of horisontality in different
contexts (especially under s 8(2) of the 1996 constitution). Cheadle and Davis (n 21) 57-60
present the clearest nuanced argument that some rights apply horisontally and others do not,
with the implication that some apply directly horisontally and others do not. Sprigman and
Osborne ``Du Plessis is not dead: South Africa's 1996 constitution and the application of the bill
of rights to private disputes'' 1999 SAJHR 25-51 present the weakest argument to the effect that
the 1996 constitution applies horisontally Ð in their view, the 1996 constitution allows indirect
horisontal application as foreseen in Du Plessis v De Klerk, but does not mandate it.
27
Van der Walt ``Justice Kriegler's . . .'' (n 21) 736. Van der Walt is here referring to Wesley
Hohfeld's distinction between rights (which have correlative duties) and privileges (which do not
have such correlative duties, as their jural correlatives are ``no-rights'', referring to the fact that
the other party has no right to object to the exercize of the privilege): see Hohfeld ``Some
fundamental conceptions as applied in legal reasoning'' 1913 Yale LJ 16-59; Hohfeld
``Fundamental legal conceptions as applied in legal reasoning'' 1917 Yale LJ 710-770.
28
contra Mahomed DP in Du Plessis v De Klerk: see Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC)
700E-H; see Van der Walt ``Justice Kriegler's . . .'' (n 21) 735.
29
''Justice Kriegler's . . .'' (n 21) 735.
30
As Mohamed DP argued in Du Plessis v De Klerk; see n 27, 28 above.
31
Van der Walt ``Perspectives'' (n 21) 11-12. The change in attitude in this article was caused by an
amended interpretation of Hohfeld's theory; see n 27 above.
32
Van der Walt ``Perspectives'' (n 21) 3.
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is, therefore, whether the constitution applies horisontally, either directly
33
or
indirectly,
34
to a private dispute between two private parties, in such a way that
the (statutory or common law) private law rules that govern the dispute are
open to amendment or influence from the constitution, even though a state
threat against either party is not directly in issue. The spectre of privatised
injustice and inequality can be addressed adequately through indirect horison-
tal application understood in this way because every rule and institution of
statutory and common law is thereby potentially opened up for constitutional
scrutiny and amendment or development.
Pro-horisontality authors accepted that direct horisontal application cases
Ð instances where a private person would rely directly on a constitutional
provision to found a cause of action against another private person in a private
dispute Ð would constitute a small minority of cases, and that the effect of the
constitution on private law would in fact largely take place indirectly via the
so-called radiating (or, in a probably weaker version, indirect seepage) effect of
constitutional principles and values.
35
The horisontalists attach great value to
the possibility that private parties with a genuine constitutional complaint
against an exercise of private power should not be left without a remedy simply
because neither the common law nor legislation provides a suitable remedy.
Horisontal application of the constitution should therefore leave space for the
creation of new remedies where these are not provided for adequately by
legislation or the common law.
36
It is probably fair to say that academic commentators now generally accept
that the 1996 constitution allows or requires horisontal application in some
way; that such horisontal application leaves no room whatever for a ``purely
private sphere'' unaffected by the constitution; that the horisontal application
of the constitution implies that any part of the common law can potentially be
affected by constitutional provisions, principles and values in one way or an-
other; and that the horisontal application will largely take place indirectly
33
Terminology on this point varies to some extent, but I follow the argument as developed by Van
der Walt and use the term ``direct horisontal application'' to refer to instances where a private
party can rely directly on a provision in the constitution to found a cause of action in a private
dispute against another private party, without involving or relying upon any other statutory or
common- law rule. See n 26 above for references to other authors on this issue.
34
See n 33 above. By extension, this would refer to instances where the cause of action is founded
upon a statutory or common law rule, but the interpretation or application of that rule is
affected by the constitution in some way in order to give effect to a specific constitutional
provision or to the ``spirit, purport or object'' of the constitution, as it is stated in s 39(2) of the
constitution.
35
See Van der Walt ``Perspectives'' (n 21) 16-17; Van der Walt ``Indirect application'' (n 25) 343-
361; Woolman ``Application'' (n 21) 10-46 Ð 10-49. Woolman is less clear on this point than
Van der Walt, but his analysis suggests a similar view.
36
See Van der Walt ``Perspectives'' (n 21) 21-29 (where he argues that open-ended common law
institutions such as actions for pure economic loss and abuse of right could be developed to
create remedies); Woolman ``Application'' (n 21) 10-51. In ``Horisontal application of
fundamental rights and the threshold of the law in view of the Carmichele saga'' 2003 SAJHR
517-540 Van der Walt identifies the shortcoming in the common law in the procedural rules that
determine whether someone would have a fair chance of a hearing and a remedy to protect
constitutionally granted or entrenched rights: in view of the common law procedure, lack of a
probable cause of action will (as it did in the initial Carmichele case in the Cape high court:
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 2 SA 656 (C)) most likely result in a judgment
of absolution from the instance, which means that the issue of finding or developing a suitable
remedy never even comes up.
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rather than directly (that is, by way of horisontal radiation, seepage or influ-
ence upon the common law rather than by way of direct reliance on constitu-
tional provisions to establish a cause of action in purely private disputes).
However, commentators leave open the possibility (clearly foreseen by section
8(2) and 8(3) of the constitution) that the horisontal application of the con-
stitution could vary according to the context of a specific case (particularly the
nature of the specific right involved and any duty imposed by it), and accord-
ingly it is still possible that a specific constitutional provision could require or
prescribe direct rather than indirect horisontal application.
37
Perhaps because
it is accepted widely that horisontal application takes place through horisontal
radiation or seepage that affects the development of the common law, the
distinction between direct and indirect horisontal application seems to have
lost most if not all of its meaning and urgency in the literature. The issues on
horisontal application appear to have dwindled to just a few matters of out-
standing detail.
2.3 Outstanding issues in the horisontality debate
The most significant issue that still enjoys attention is the way in which hor-
isontal application is supposed to take place in practice. Three lines of debate
can be discerned in the literature, one of which I will just mention and then
raise again in the discussion of case law and in the analysis of German law and
international law in two later sections, because it has not enjoyed much atten-
tion in the literature so far.
38
This concerns the gradual but distinctive move-
ment in case law, when considering the effect of the constitution on private law,
away from the discourse of horisontal application of fundamental rights and
towards a new discourse about the state's duty to protect fundamental rights.
The second remaining line of discussion in the literature concerns the ques-
tion of new remedies. Both Stuart Woolman and Johan van der Walt, probably
the two most prolific and important authors on horisontal application, have
pointed out the significance of the theory of horisontal application for the
eventual availability of new, alternative, amended or developed private law
remedies resulting from the influence of the constitution.
39
Johan van der
Walt has argued convincingly that the weak spot of the common law that
37
See eg Van der Walt ``Perspectives'' (n 21) 11. An example of the latter would perhaps be the
right to equality and non-discrimination in s 9: s 9(4) seems to aim for direct horisontal
application, and prior to the promulgation of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of
Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 direct horisontal application must have been possible and
even necessary. See further Cheadle and Davis (n 21) 59.
38
The exception is an early discussion of German law (I suspect by De Waal) in Davis, Chaskalson
and De Waal ``Democracy and constitutionalism: the role of constitutional interpretation'' in
Van Wyk, Dugard, De Villiers and Davis (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism: The New South
African Legal Order (1994) 1 96-97.
39
Van der Walt ``Perspectives'' (n 21) 16-17; Van der Walt ``Indirect application'' (n 25) 343-361;
Woolman ``Application'' (n 21) 10-46±10-49. In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA
786 (CC) the constitutional court decided that, while there was no reason why appropriate relief
for infringement of a constitutional right should not, in suitable cases, include an award of
damages, such an award would have to be necessary to protect and enforce the fundamental
rights and should be made only to compensate persons who suffered loss as a result of the
infringement of the right. However, there was no need for further constitutional damages aimed
purely at vindicating the constitutional right.
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has to be improved with regard to remedies is located in the rules and practices
of civil procedure, and more specifically in the institution of an order of abso-
lution from the instance, which means that a case is dismissed because the
plaintiff could not produce a probable cause of action recognised by the com-
mon law.
40
When a plaintiff takes a case to court on the basis that the common
law needs to be developed to provide a new remedy, there is a risk that the case
could be dismissed without the effect of the constitution or the issue of a new
remedy having been considered at all, because the law of civil procedure allows
the court to dismiss the case because no cause of action (according to tradi-
tional law) was revealed initially.
41
This astute observation by Johan van der
Walt clearly opens up an important line of further investigation for the con-
stitutionally inspired development of private law through the development of
the law of civil procedure. Inevitably, this kind of development of the common
law will involve fairly radical amendments of the existing law, and it may
eventually require legislative intervention. In the meantime, in the absence of
suitable legislation, it demands a strong, radiation-type development that re-
sembles a paradigm shift rather than just weak, seepage-type interstitial or
incremental developments. More debate and work is required in this field.
In a third remaining line of debate about horisontality, several cases and a
handful of academic commentaries have raised questions about the mechanics
and dynamics of the development of common law: when does development
take place in accordance with the ``normal'', internal dynamism of the common
law as an organic and evolving system of living law, and when does it take
place under the pressure of constitutional command? What should the scale
and pace of development be, and how does one determine the right scale and
pace Ð according to the internal logic of a typically private law jurisprudence
built on stare decisis, or according to the logic of constitutional demand? Does
the development of private law involve small incremental developments or can
it include a larger paradigm shift? Is the nature of development similar for all
of private law, or are there hot spots where development is more urgent, more
radical and more sensitive than in other areas?
Several court decisions have indicated a preference for the non-statutory
development of the common law in terms of the ``normal'', internal processes
of the common law itself,
42
and these decisions have found support in academic
commentaries according to which private law has to be protected against what
has been described as an unwarranted colonisation or invasion of private law
by constitutional thinking and logic.
43
As for the pace and the dynamism of the
development of common law, many private law specialists prefer a step-by-
step, so-called interstitial approach,
44
according to which private law is allowed
to develop as naturally and logically as possible within its own dogmatic frame-
40
See Van der Walt ``Horisontal application'' (n 36) 517-540; cf n 93-94 below.
41
As demonstrated by the initial decision in the Carmichele case; compare n 93 below.
42
See eg National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA); Commissioner of Customs and
Excise v Container Logistics (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Rennies Group
Ltd t/a Renfreight 1999 3 SA 771 (SCA). See the discussion of Jayiya v Member of the Executive
Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2004 2 SA 611 (SCA) in 3.4 below.
43
See eg Visser ``Successful constitutional invasion'' (n 19) 745-750; Visser ``Geen afsonderlike eis''
(n 19) 695-700; Visser ``Horisontaliteit'' (n 19) 510-514; Van der Merwe (n 19) 12-32; but cf
Carpenter and Botha (n 19) 126-135 for a critique.
44
As explained by Hart (n 15) 37-38.
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work, rather than a larger, possibly paradigm-threatening development driven
and animated by the constitution ``from outside''.
45
These arguments align
with the weak notion of constitutional seepage, where the influence of the
constitution in private law assumes the form of slow, small-scale prompts
towards internal development of private law, whereas the notion of constitu-
tional radiation could be interpreted more strongly to include much larger,
paradigm shift-types of development that are forced upon the common law
by strong ``external'', constitutional demands.
The viability of the weaker, integrity-saving or development-from-within
approach is probably the most important and contentious issue in what re-
mains of the application debate. On the one hand, it has to be conceded that
this approach is in line with the concern for legal certainty and stability. On the
other hand, it has to be asked whether development within the existing frame-
work of private law thinking can always attain the kind and the scope of
development or transformation foreseen or demanded by the new constitu-
tional order, and whether it might not in some instances bring with it a ten-
dency to entrench the existing whenever possible and to resist or minimise
inevitable change. The effect is illustrated by two recent decisions of the su-
preme court of appeal: Brisley v Drotsky
46
and Afrox Health Care Bpk v Stry-
dom.
47
In his thoughtful analysis of the two decisions in view of the effect of the
constitution on private law, Lubbe
48
is critical of what may be perceived as
overly careful and perhaps even conservative sentiments of the SCA, but even
he is perhaps still too lenient in his assessment of the SCA's view of develop-
ment of the common law in view of the spirit, purport and object of the
constitution. As is argued in the discussion of case law below, there is a danger
that the civil courts could, if attempting to develop private law in terms of its
own doctrinal dynamism instead of under the more or less direct and possibly
more immediate influence of the constitution and its attendant transforma-
tional aspirations, tend to preserve existing law and resist or minimise change.
Much more work is required in this area, particularly in the form of more
technical, focused debates about the development of the common law in spe-
cialised areas of private law where the demand for change and development
might be more urgent or more radical than in others; hot spots where either the
scale or the direction of the required development might not fit in with the
internal logic of the common law. Given its special role in the establishment of
apartheid and the special attention it consequently receives in the constitution
and in land reform law, the private law of eviction is a good candidate for hot-
spot status. Some work has already been done in this field and I return to it
below.
45
See eg Van Aswegen (n 15) 171-195; Lubbe (n 15) 395-423.
46
2002 4 SA 1 (SCA).
47
2002 6 SA 21 (SCA).
48
2004 SALJ 395-423. The facts and decisions in the two cases are set out and discussed in detail in
Lubbe's article and I do not repeat them here. See further Botha ``Freedom and constraint'' (n 5)
249-283, who critiques the Afrox decision in detail and refers to further discussions of the case
(269 n 66). Hawthorne ``Closing of the open norms in the law of contract'' 2004 THRHR 294
criticises the SCA for its hesitance in cases like Afrox to develop the notion of freedom of
contract in accordance with s 39(2).
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3 The South African application issue in case law
3.1 Horisontal application under the 1993 constitution
Under the 1993 interim constitution the high courts decided a few cases invol-
ving defamation
49
and equality
50
issues. In the majority of these cases the
courts accepted that the constitution intended to transform South African
society, that the inequities and injustices of the past were not restricted to
exercises of state power, and that the fundamental rights provisions in the
constitution therefore had to apply horisontally in one way or another to
49
See eg Gardener v Whitaker 1994 5 BCLR 19 (E), where Froneman J concluded that, while
fundamental rights are primarily aimed at safeguarding the rights of individuals against the
state, ``there is an apparent need to ensure that the values inherent in the charters should
permeate throughout the entire legal system, albeit indirectly in most cases. This is hardly
surprising, because the very foundations upon which these societies seek to structure and
develop themselves are to a large extent contained in their charters of fundamental rights'' (30B).
Since the South African 1993 interim constitution was also concerned that the entire legal
system, including private law, should accord with the broader values of the constitution,
Froneman J concluded that the deepest norms of the constitution should determine whether an
alleged breach of a fundamental right in private litigation involves explicit constitutional
adjudication, or whether it could be left to the rules of common law to evolve in harmony with
the values of the constitution. The basic constitutional concern with transformation would, in
the judge's view, sometimes call for explicit application of the fundamental rights provisions
between private individuals, because the past of suffering and injustice ``is not merely a history
of repressive State action against individuals, but it is also a history of structural inequality and
injustice on racial and other grounds, gradually filtering through to virtually all spheres of
society'' (31F). Nevertheless, transformation of private law does not involve a radical break with
all the legal traditions of the past Ð all aspects of the common law that come before the courts
need to be scrutinised to determine whether leaving them unaffected by the constitution would
amount to perpetuation of the undemocratic, discriminatory and unjust past (31H-32C).
Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 2 SA 588 (W) was also a defamation case decided under
the 1993 interim constitution. In this case Cameron J decided that certain bodies and persons
would not, without legislative provision, be bound by the fundamental rights provisions, and
that the unqualified theory of horisontality therefore had to be rejected (597D). The
fundamental rights provisions nevertheless informed all legal institutions and decisions with
the new power of constitutional values (598C-D). Any common law rule that infringed upon
fundamental rights had to be reconsidered fundamentally in view of the constitution (603G-H).
Mandela v Falati 1995 1 SA 251 (W) was another defamation case, and Van Schalkwyk J decided
that political activity takes place both on the vertical and the horisontal levels, which means that
the rights necessary to conduct political activity also have to apply on both levels (257I). The
fundamental rights of individuals should therefore be applied in private disputes of this nature
(258E).
50
See eg Baloro v University of Bophuthatswana 1995 8 BCLR 1018 (B). The case concerned a
labour dispute between a university and employees who were foreign nationals, and who claimed
that they had been unfairly discriminated against. Friedman JP decided that the constitution was
intended to create a new legal order and to redress the inequities and discriminations of the past,
and that the fundamental rights provisions were meant to operate horisontally (1050E). It was
particularly clear that horisontal application of the fundamental rights would affect siseable
corporations and companies engaged in trade, commerce and business in the public domain,
because these institutions had the same kind of power, wealth and influence as the state. It
would definitely affect universities (1056C). Friedman JP stated that the notion of ``horisontal
seepage'' detracted from the principles enshrined in the constitution, and he wanted to construe
the horisontal effect of the constitution stronger than that. Motala v University of Natal 1995 3
BCLR 374 (D) concerned the admission of a student to the University of Natal medical school.
Hurt J confirmed that the constitution was intended to replace parliamentary supremacy with
constitutional supremacy and that the constitution therefore made the courts the custodians of
the fundamental rights, and empowered the courts to drive the process through which the
common law was brought into accord with the constitutional provisions. The fundamental
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ensure that private law (and the private relations governed by it) was also
included in the transformation process.
One high court decision that rejected horisontal application of the funda-
mental rights provisions outright because it would cause ``the whole body of
our private law to become unsettled''
51
was subsequently overturned by the
constitutional court.
52
The draft of the 1996 constitution was already in an
advanced state of completion and it was reasonably clear that the final con-
stitution would make provision for horisontal application, but the decision of
the constitutional court in Du Plessis v De Klerk nevertheless settled the matter
as far as the 1993 interim constitution was concerned: the majority of the court
held that the resolution of the horisontality issue must ultimately depend upon
the specific provisions of the constitution; that general (direct) horisontal ap-
plication in the sense of direct invocation of constitutional rights in private
litigation was not intended;
53
that a party in private litigation may nonetheless
contend that a statute or executive act relied on by the other party was incon-
sistent with the constitution (ie indirect horisontal application); and that the
fundamental rights provisions do apply to private law, so that government
actions or omissions in reliance upon private law may be attacked by a private
litigant in a dispute against the state for being inconsistent with the constitu-
tion.
54
3.2 Horisontal application under the 1996 constitution
Following upon the decision in favour of indirect horisontal application in Du
Plessis v De Klerk, it could not very likely be argued that there would be no
form of horisontal application under the 1996 constitution, especially since
section 8 of the 1996 constitution made rather obvious provision for some
form of horisontal application. Since the 1996 constitution came into power
it has therefore been accepted widely that the fundamental rights provisions
apply horisontally Ð the only outstanding issue was: when, and how?
As was indicated in the previous section, a number of specific issues feature
in what remains of the application debate. The first issue arises from decisions
(and academic commentary) in which the effect of the constitution on private
law is minimized or even indirectly denied by focusing on internal doctrinal
developments in private law that would reach the same result. The basic point
of departure in these cases is that the development of private law should Ð and
can Ð take place in terms of the internal dynamism of private law or common
law itself, and not under the external force of the constitution. This approach
can have two related and often overlapping Ð but nevertheless distinctly dif-
ferent Ð results in case law where the development of private law is at stake.
One result is to acknowledge that a particular development of the common law
is required, but to deny that it takes place under the influence of the constitu-
51
per Van Dijkhorst J in De Klerk v Du Plessis 1994 6 BCLR 124 (T).
52
Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC). For discussions of this decision see the sources
cited in n 21 above.
53
In Du Plessis v De Klerk (n 52) Ackermann J dedicated the entire five pages of his analysis of
German law (par 92-106 704F-709E) to a detailed considerations of the reasons why the German
courts and scholars rejected (and why South African courts should also reject) direct horisontal
application and instead work with indirect horisontal application only.
54
per Kentridge J par 49 684G-685A.
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tion, insisting that the development was inspired by and is accommodated
within the ``normal'' process of dogmatic development, even in the face of
strong evidence that the same court opposed the development in the pre-con-
stitution past. In National Media Ltd v Bogoshi
55
the supreme court of appeal
insisted that the development of the common law principles with regard to
defamation that was at stake in this case occurred and should be explained
in terms of the dynamic development of the common law of delict,
56
and not in
terms of a development required by the new constitutional values or provi-
sions. In many cases this will not make much difference, as the fact that the
development takes place is after all the main point, but this attitude does reveal
or hint at a certain discomfort with the idea that the common law and the
constitution form part of one integral legal system, with the constitution play-
ing a direction-giving role. In Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Container
Logistics (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Rennies Group Ltd
t/a Renfreight
57
the SCA decided that, since the common law grounds for
judicial review of administrative action were left intact by the 1993 interim
constitution, it could set aside such action on common law grounds without
considering whether it also fell foul of the constitutional grounds.
58
This deci-
sion was subsequently set aside by the constitutional court with a rather
sharply worded remark to the effect that the common law cannot be treated
``as a body of law separate and distinct from the Constitution'' Ð there is just
one system of law, of which the common law and the constitution both form
part, with the latter as supreme law shaping and giving force to all law.
59
Although the common law remains relevant to the process, judicial review of
55
1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA).
56
In Neethling v Du Preez; Neethling v The Weekly Mail 1994 1 SA 708 (A) the appellate division
of the supreme court held that a newspaper could only escape a claim for defamation if it could
establish that what was published was true; and it confirmed the rule of strict liability in
defamation cases against the media that was laid down earlier in Pakendorf v De Flamingh 1982
3 SA 146 (A): see Van der Walt ``Indirect application'' (n 25) 356. In Bogoshi the SCA now held
that the common law was wrongly stated and that the common law principle should be restated
correctly: publication of false defamatory allegations of fact would not be regarded as unlawful
if, upon consideration of all the circumstances, it was found to have been reasonable to have
published the facts in the particular way at the time (1212G-H). Only once the true statement of
the common law has been attained in terms of the common law itself does the court deem it
necessary to ascertain that the (correctly stated) common law rule is not in conflict with the
constitution. Academic commentators who are against or sceptical of horisontal application
might have been expected to regard Bogoshi as an excellent decision, but surprisingly some
thought that it did not go far enough in rejecting ``constitutional argument in drag''; see Van der
Merwe (n 19) 21. Academic commentators in favour of horisontal application and
constitutionally inspired development of the common law point out that the avoidance of the
true effect of the constitution in this decision is cynical and misleading; see Van der Walt
``Indirect application'' (n 25) 341-363. See further on this decision Botha ``Freedom and
constraint'' (n 5) 253-255: Bogoshi treats earlier decisions that undermined press freedom as
``unwarranted deviations from the unfolding logic of the common law'' and seeks to cleanse the
common law from such errors by overruling (Pakendorf) or ignoring (Neethling) them; once that
has been done the court declares that the common law balance between press freedom and
personal integrity is in line with constitutional demands. In the process, the integral links
between apartheid law and restraints on press freedom during the pre-1994 era are ignored or
denied.
57
1999 3 SA 771 (SCA).
58
S 24 of the 1993 constitution provided for a right to just administrative action.
59
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA; In Re: Ex Parte Application of President of the
RSA 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) par 44.
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the exercise of public power is now a constitutional matter that takes place
according to the provisions of the constitution.
60
The second result of this attitude is that the courts, even when they acknow-
ledge that development is necessary and that the change is inspired by the
constitution, insist that the development should take place according to the
timing, methodology and logic of private law and not according to vague and
implicit constitutional values. This could often result in necessary develop-
ments being minimalised or even frustrated. In Brisley v Drotsky
61
and Afrox
Health Care Bpk v Strydom
62
it was contended that certain contractual
clauses
63
should be declared invalid because they were unfair and in conflict
with the general principle of good faith. In both cases this argument was
rejected, and the result is that general ``provisions such as non-variation and
exemption clauses therefore cannot be defeated by direct and explicit recourse
to the argument that to enforce them would be unfair and consequently against
good faith. Good faith in the sense indicated . . . is relevant only to the extent
that its precepts are mediated by rules of law.''
64
It was accepted in both cases
that public policy Ð of which open-ended norms such as good faith form part
Ð is now informed by the fundamental values in the constitution,
65
and that
the constitution might ``spur on the development of new substantive rules of
law'',
66
but it was nevertheless decided that neither the demands of good faith
nor the constitutional values and principles ``were sufficient to outweigh the
traditional bias in favour of the strict enforcement of agreements'',
67
and con-
sequently the clauses in question were upheld.
Two problems emerge from these decisions. Firstly, in some cases the SCA
demonstrated a worrying failure to grasp the fundamental difference between
central values of private law and ``the spirit, purport and object of the Con-
stitution''. On the one hand the SCA relies on a much contested bright-line
distinction between rules and general standards for this decision,
68
and on the
other hand it elevates private law rules (the right of ownership or the freedom
to contract and strict enforceability of contracts) to the same level as constitu-
tional values and declares the former as deserving of the same protection as any
of the ``new'' (transformational) values highlighted by the theory of transfor-
mative constitutionalism. In doing so, the SCA denied the fundamentally po-
litical, transformational nature of the constitution and of the developments
that are required by its adoption as the heart of the post-apartheid legal system.
60
Par 51 263B.
61
2002 4 SA 1 (SCA).
62
2002 6 SA 21 (SCA). The case is critiqued by Botha ``Freedom and constraint'' (n 5) 249-283,
who refers to further discussions of the decision (269 n 66).
63
In Brisley it was a non-variation clause that required any variation of the initial written
document to comply with certain self-imposed formalities; in Afrox it was an exemption clause
that excluded liability that would otherwise have attached to one of the parties because of the
general principles of contract. As Lubbe (n 15) 396 points out, both clauses are ``regarded as
permissible manifestations of contractual freedom, even where they occur in standard-form
contracts unilaterally drawn up by one of the parties''.
64
Lubbe (n 15) 398.
65
in view of the decision in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (CALS intervening) 2001
4 SA 938 (CC); see Brisley par 91 34G-H; Afrox par 18 37D-E.
66
Lubbe (n 15) 401.
67
Lubbe (n 15) 401, 414.
68
This aspect of especially the Afrox decision is critiqued extensively by Botha ``Freedom and
constraint'' (n 5) 249-283.
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The decision to entrench private law rules such as sanctity of contract on a
constitutional foundation
69
sets up a reactionary and potentially destructive
barrier in the way of transformation and it blows the tension between stability
and transformation up into a constitutional conflict, much in the way that the
Indian courts did before the property clause was removed from the Indian
constitution.
70
Logically, this move is on a par with arguments to the effect
that constitutionally sanctioned and statutorily regulated affirmative action
amounts to reverse discrimination Ð it is true in a certain trite way, but misses
the point of transformative constitutionalism altogether. It simply denies the
political history and context of the constitution's transformative programme
and pretends that the development of the law in view of the constitution is
nothing extraordinary Ð just business as usual.
71
The second significant move in the two SCA decisions is to refuse to develop
the common law in the cases at hand because, in the absence of extraordinary
reasons for doing so, the development in question would involve an amend-
ment of existing private law rights for which the court Ð in its own opinion Ð
does not have an explicit statutory discretion, and therefore it simply affirmed
the existing private law situation.
72
This argumentative move is illustrated
particularly clearly by Brisley v Drotsky, which (apart from the contract issue
described and analysed by Lubbe) also involved an eviction application. Evic-
tion is an issue that highlights the real transformative appeal and potential of
the constitution much more vividly than contract, simply because it was so
much more obviously involved in the political construction of apartheid.
Section 26(3) of the South African constitution of 1996 provides that ``[n]o
one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without
an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No
legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.'' On the face of it, this provision
amends the (uncodified) South African common law, according to which the
owner of immovable property is entitled to possession of the
69
See Lubbe (n 15) 415, where he expresses qualified approval of this move.
70
See n 14 above.
71
By contrast, the constitutional court decided in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers
2005 1 SA 217 (CC) par 8-23 that the historical context within which marginalisation and social
injustice originated and the constitutional context in which its reform is anticipated have to be
taken into account when interpreting and applying laws that amend or reform the common law.
72
According to Roux ``Continuity and change in a transforming legal order: The impact of section
26(3) of the constitution on South African law'' 2004 SALJ 466-492 the eviction part of the
Brisley decision should be seen as anti-uncertainty rather than anti-constitutional; the SCA was
attempting to avoid uncertainty by opting for stability and continuity in the legal position
regarding eviction. In view of Henk Botha's analysis of constitutional adjudication (Botha
``Freedom and constraint'' (n 5) 249-283, especially 259) this effort to uphold the rule of law and
continuity should not clear the SCA from blame, as it can be described as either denial or bad
faith (in Kennedy's terminology) that avoids ``transformative dialogue about social issues'' (see
Botha 259 for references). Botha's criticism of the SCA's position on stare decisis in Afrox
(Botha 270) is particularly instructive when compared to the approach of Froneman J in Kate v
Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 SA 141
(SE); see n 85-86 and surrounding text below.
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property and may evict anybody from it by merely proving that the plaintiff is
owner of land occupied by the defendant.
73
In response to section 26(3)
74
anti-
eviction legislation has been promulgated
75
to place restrictions on the com-
mon-law right to obtain an eviction, in that the relevant legislative provisions
require a court order that may only be granted after taking into regard con-
siderations that had no relevance in common law, such as the social or eco-
nomic position of the occupier. It cannot be denied that section 26(3) poses
interpretation problems for the courts:
76
in the case law dealing with these
provisions there are signs of considerable confusion and disagreement about
the effect of section 26(3) and the legislation promulgated to give effect to it;
77
but some of these decisions were also inspired by unwillingness to amend the
common law in a way that would detract from the common-law rights of
73
The raising of a valid defence is left to the occupier: as long as the owner satisfies the initial
burden of proof and the defendant fails to raise a valid defence in law, the personal, social or
economic circumstances of either party are not considered by the court. The common-law
authority is Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 6 1 2; 6 1 24. The locus classicus is Chetty v Naidoo
1974 3 SA 13 (A) 20A-G; see further Vulcan Rubber Works (Pty) Ltd v South African Railways
and Harbours 1958 3 SA 285 (A) 289A-G.
74
read together with s 25(6): ``A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an
Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure, or to comparable redress.'' S 25(9)
provides: ``Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6).''
75
Eg s 5 of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 (applies to a technically
circumscribed category of farm labourers known as labour tenants), s 9 of the Extension of
Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (applies only to land used for non-commercial purposes
outside of the urban areas), and s 8 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (applies to urban and rural land, but is restricted to
occupiers who do not have permission or a right to occupy). See the overview of anti-eviction
legislation in Van der Walt ``Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure, and eviction orders: A
model to evaluate South African land-reform legislation'' 2002 TSAR 254-289.
76
Roux (n 72) 474 lists five plausible interpretations of the subsection. His argument is that the
courts have to decide between transformation and continuity when dealing with land reform
laws and that they often opt for continuity when the choice is not clearly prescribed by the
constitutional provision or the legislation in question. This is no doubt correct. However, when
making this choice it is equally important to remember the historical context and the role that
eviction played in the apartheid era, a consideration that might arguably prompt a different
choice in this specific instance. See in this regard Van der Walt (n 75) 372-420.
77
In Ross v South Peninsula Municipality 2000 1 SA 589 (C) the Cape high court decided that s
26(3) of the constitution amended the common law and that a landowner can no longer obtain
an eviction order by simply satisfying the common-law onus of proof Ð instead, s 26(3) placed
an additional onus on the plaintiff to inform the court of circumstances that might enable it to
exercise its discretion. In Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-Epoh 2000 4 SA 468 (W) the
Witwatersrand high court disagreed, arguing that the common law right to obtain an eviction
order was left unaffected by the constitution. A similar decision was reached by the Cape high
court in Ellis v Viljoen 2001 5 BCLR 487 (C). For a discussion of the cases see Keightley ``The
impact of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act on an owner's right to vindicate immovable
property'' 1999 SAJHR 277-307; Van der Walt (n 75) 372-420; Roux (n 72) 466-492.
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landowners.
78
The decision in Brisley v Drotsky
79
is interesting in this land
reform context because the SCA decided that, although the constitution ap-
plied horisontally and therefore affected landlord-tenant relationships, no
practical effect could be given to the provision in section 26(3) that a court
should only allow an eviction after considering all the relevant circumstances.
In the absence of specific legislation that grants the courts the discretion to
amend the common law and deprive a landowner of his common-law right to
an eviction upon consideration of specified circumstances, the only circum-
stances that were relevant to an eviction are ownership and occupation Ð
the elements of the common-law burden of proof for an eviction. In effect,
the SCA simply denied its responsibility to give content or effect to section
26(3) and amend or develop the common law with regard to eviction unless it
was specifically and explicitly instructed to do so by tailor-made legislation.
Considered against the backdrop of the role that eviction played in the apart-
heid era this is a very strong position to assume, and a clear indication that Ð
left to themselves Ð there is no guarantee that the civil courts would develop
the common law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the constitution
according to the ``normal'' development processes of private law logic. The
more radical, paradigm shift-type developments that might be required in
sensitive areas of the common law and that have not or cannot be effected
by legislation will only be made by the civil courts if they openly acknowledge
and honour their constitutional duty to make these developments in order to
properly integrate the common law into the single, constitution-driven legal
system that we now have.
78
These cases involved the applicability of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) Ð which unquestionably restricts the common-law
right to obtain an eviction order by placing an additional burden of proof on the plaintiff Ð in
``normal'' landlord-tenant situations. In a series of cases beginning with ABSA Bank Ltd v Amod
1999 2 All SA 423 (W) the courts argued that the act was intended to cater for unlawful
occupation of land and not for ``normal'' landlord-tenant situations where the occupation
became unlawful through holding over. The issue was settled when the SCA decided in Ndlovu v
Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika 2003 1 SA 113 (SCA) 125B-H (par 21-23) that PIE indeed applied to
former tenants who were holding over, because there was not a sufficiently clear indication of
legislative intention to the contrary, and it could not be discounted that the legislature intended
to extend the applicability of PIE to holding over by tenants and similar occupiers whose right of
occupation had been terminated or expired. In the latest decision on this matter (at the time of
writing), Davids v Van Straaten case no 901/2005 (C) judgment of 17 March 2005 (unreported),
the Cape high court followed the Ndlovu/Bekker judgment and decided a holding over case in
terms of PIE. The court considered the personal circumstances of the majority of occupiers to be
such that it would not be unfair to grant the eviction order against them. The most interesting
aspect of the decision involved a 77 year old woman who had no income; she was allowed to stay
on in the apartment on the strength of a settlement offer from the owner, but the court obviously
regarded the settlement as a fair one. It remains unclear whether she would also have been
allowed to stay on in the absence of the settlement. The question is, of course, whether the
outcome means that it is expected, in terms of PIE, that private property owners should bear the
burden of the duty to provide access to housing for those whose personal and social position do
not allow them to gain access on their own. The matter is to be settled by amendment legislation;
see Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Draft Amendment
Bill (GG 27370) (18 March 2005). In terms of s 2 of the latest version of the draft amendment bill
the act would not apply to a person who occupied land as a tenant, in terms of any other
agreement, or as the owner of the land and who continues to hold over despite the fact that the
tenancy or agreement or ownership has been validly terminated.
79
2002 4 SA 1 (SCA).
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Theunis Roux argues that the choice in Brisley was anti-uncertainty rather
than simply anti-constitutional,
80
and points out that this choice Ð albeit
perhaps understandable as the kind of choice many lawyers would prefer in-
stinctively Ð could unnecessarily close down the transformative potential of
the constitution, especially in situations where the legislature has not yet acted
to indicate the direction of development. The judgment in Port Elizabeth Mu-
nicipality v Various Occupiers
81
makes it clear that the constitutional court
favours a contextual, transformative view of eviction, which means that the
common law relating to eviction has to be developed (and new eviction legisla-
tion has to be interpreted) in a way that will reflect the constitutional choice for
change Ð in this specific instance, continuity and change have to make way for
development and change because of a clearly justified constitutional aspiration
directly relating to the abolition and dismantling of the apartheid past and the
building of a more equitable and just future land law. As far as eviction is
concerned, the common law is subjected to direct influence and change inspired
by constitutional provisions and aspirations.
Johan van der Walt
82
writes that ``the horisontal application of rights ob-
viously constitutes a critical junction between constitutional and common-law
jurisprudence in the resolution of private-law disputes and therefore between
the two fields of adjudication that delimit the domains of the Supreme Court of
Appeal and the Constitutional Court''. He argues very strongly in favour of a
style of indirect horisontal application that will not allow the civil courts to shy
away from development of the common law that goes against the grain of long-
standing and perhaps treasured private law principles and institutions, when
necessary. The co-operative relation between common law and constitutional
jurisprudence that he pleads for can only develop, in his view, if the difference
between common law and constitutional law that is upheld in the notion of
indirect horisontal application ``remains a creative difference or tension, a
difference that in fact accentuates the constitutional challenge to common
law. It is to be rejected if the difference that it invokes between common law
and constitutional law is to be conceived in terms of a shield that fends off the
constitutional challenge to existing law.''
83
Moreover, Van der Walt argues,
84
this is not a new or strange thing for private law, because the tension cha-
racterises common law institutions themselves Ð it is the ``tension between a
drive towards closure and certainty and a desire to re-open and include what
has hitherto been excluded, despite the degree of uncertainty that this re-open-
ing and inclusion re-introduces into the system. This is the age-old tension
between clear-cut rules and open-ended principles . . .'' To this one could per-
haps add that the explicit transformation-oriented words of the constitution,
read within its historical and political context, indicate quite clearly that clear-
cut rules cannot be allowed to stand in the way of change indicated by
80
Roux (n 72) 492.
81
2005 1 SA 217 (CC). See the discussion of the case in } 3.4 below.
82
especially Van der Walt ``Indirect application'' (n 25) 343-361.
83
355.
84
360.
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open-ended principles that demand the transformation of South African law
away from inequality and unfairness and towards greater equality and fairness.
In a recent decision,
85
Froneman J expressed a view regarding the duties of
the courts in language that strongly evokes Johan van der Walt's position:
``But it should be clear that these [practical] difficulties may not serve as an excuse for failing to
fashion and enforce new remedies simply because they did not exist under the common law. In
these situations the judge who fails to examine the existing law with a view to ensuring the
effective realisation of constitutional rights and values that were not recognised before is not, as
is often presumed by proponents of this course, merely neutrally and objectively applying the
law. That will only ever be true if the existing common law proceeds from a fair and equal
baseline, an assumption that will not often be open to the present judiciary in South Africa in
cases such as the present, given our unequal past. More often than not such a supine approach
will effectively result in a choice for the retention of an unequal and unjust status quo.''
86
In this decision, Froneman J accepts that it is the duty of high court judges to
develop the existing law and create new remedies to meet the needs of poor and
marginalised citizens and to promote effective, accountable and transparent
public administration. Moreover, when faced with seemingly restraining
authority in higher courts' judgments that could prevent a judge from honour-
ing this duty, Froneman J concluded that the demands of the constitution and
the rule of law are supreme. He voiced his concern about the potentially
``chilling'' effect of a too restrictive interpretation of the SCA decision in Jayiya
v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape as follows:
87
85
Kate v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 SA
141 (SE). The case attracted attention in the media; see Rickard ``Judge in revolt takes on the
law for the sake of justice'' The Sunday Times (SA) [26-09-2004] 20.
86
Kate case (n 85) par 16.
87
2004 2 SA 611 (SCA). As is explained by Froneman J in the introductory section of the Kate
decision (par 5-15), this decision has a history in the ``persistent and huge problem with the
administration of social grants'' in the Eastern Cape province and the fact that the courts
emerged as ``the primary mechanisms for ensuring accountability in the public administration of
social grants'': par 5. The most significant recent cases in which the courts attempted to enforce
public accountability are Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2002 1 SA 342 (SE);
Mbanga v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2002 1 SA 359 (SE), in which Leach J granted
applicants whose applications for social security grants have nor been dealt with timeously
constitutional relief, consisting of orders for back pay and interest, under s 38(1) of the
constitution. In addition, responsible public functionaries were held accountable and declared in
contempt of court where judgment debts sounding in money against the state were not paid:
Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 4 SA 446 (Tk); East London
Transitional Local Council v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape 2000 4 All SA 443 (Ck). In the recent
past, court applications based on these decisions have often resulted in ``administrative failures''
being rectified, However, in the Kate case the Eastern Cape government seemed to adopt a new,
more defiant stance seemingly based on their interpretation of the SCA decision in Jayiya v
Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2004 2 SA 611 (SCA). Although the
issue of back pay and interest was not directly relevant to the case in Jayiya (the SCA explicitly
acknowledged that the issue was not argued and that its remarks on this point were therefore
hesitant) the SCA nevertheless included in its decision general remarks that create the impression
that back pay and interest, claimed by way of constitutional relief in terms of s 38(1) of the
constitution, might be unsuitable because constitutional damages was an exceptional remedy
only to be used if the common law and legislation do not provide suitable remedies; a remedy
was available to the applicant in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA);
and relief of this nature could not be claimed under PAJA.
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``'In matters where there may be doubt or ambiguity in higher court authority, and where that
doubt or ambiguity may have serious consequences for upholding the fundamental
constitutional values of the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law, I would
respectfully suggest that High Court judges of first instance are obliged to follow the
interpretation of authority that in their serious and considered opinion would serve the
Constitution and the rule of law best.''
88
Despite the conservative approach followed in Brisley v Drotsky and perhaps
also in Jayiya, there are encouraging signs that the constitutional impetus in
favour of transformation will eventually outweigh any hesitation or reluctance
that may remain on the side of some courts or commentators. One particularly
encouraging result appears from the SCA decision in Modderklip,
89
which
acknowledged the influence of the constitution and the necessity of amending
and developing the common law to accommodate or promote the spirit, pur-
port and objectives of the constitution, up to and including the point of sub-
jecting a landowner's common law right of eviction to a stalling manoeuvre
that would allow the state to find alternative accommodation for the unlawful
occupiers before evicting them. Moreover, the supreme court of appeal was
willing to exercise its discretion in this case without the benefit of a clear
statutory mandate. On constitutional considerations it was also willing to
fashion a new remedy that would solve the case satisfactorily in the short
and in the longer term. Intriguingly, the supreme court of appeal reached its
decision inModderklip with reference to a new vocabulary, which is founded in
a different theory about the effect of the constitution on private law than has
been relied upon before Ð any mention of horisontal application played a
background role in this case, while much more was made of the state's duty
to protect its citizens' fundamental rights. By contrast, an equally progressive
(and arguably more comprehensively argued) result was reached in the con-
stitutional court decision in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers,
90
without any mention of the state's duty to protect. Moreover, on appeal in the
Modderklip decision the constitutional court also managed to uphold the su-
preme court of appeal's order, on different grounds, without referring to the
state duty to protect argument. However, the duty to protect argument was
used previously in another important constitutional court decision. The court's
shift from horisontal application discourse to duty to protect discourse in the
case law Ð and the effect of this shift for horisontal application discourse Ð is
the topic for discussion in subsequent sections of this article.
3.3 The state's duty to protect
In recent cases, a new vocabulary has entered into the courts' discussion of the
effect of the constitution on private law: instead of the horisontal application
88
Kate v The Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1
SA 141 (SE) par 27. Compare the much more restrictive view of stare decisis in Afrox Health
Care Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) and the criticism of that view by Botha ``Freedom and
constraint'' (n 5) 270; cf n 72 above.
89
Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; President of the Republic of South
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 8 BCLR 821 (SCA). The order of the SCA was
upheld on appeal by the constitutional ourt, albeit for different reasons; see President of the
Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd case CCT 20/04 2005-05-13 (CC). The
CC decision is discussed below.
90
2005 1 SA 217 (CC).
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of the fundamental rights, the courts now refer to the state's duty to protect
fundamental rights when considering cases where the common law and Ð
particularly but not exclusively Ð private law
91
is or should be developed in
accordance with constitutional provisions, principles or values.
92
The duty to
protect language originated in a constitutional court decision but found its way
Ð via an interesting detour Ð into the SCA decision in Modderklip.
The most important case in which the duty to protect was referred to as the
basis on which the common law must be developed in accordance with the
constitution is Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied
Legal Studies Intervening).
93
The applicant in this case claimed delictual da-
mages from the respondents on the basis that they owed a legal duty to protect
her; that they negligently acted in breach of that duty; and that she conse-
quently suffered damage. The action that caused the applicant harm was in fact
committed by another private person, but she claimed that the respondents (a
police officer and public prosecutors) were responsible because they failed to
oppose bail while the attacker was awaiting trial and recommended that he be
released on warning, despite repeated warnings and expressions of concern
about the safety of the applicant. He attacked the applicant and caused her
serious injury while he was out on bail. The applicant's case was dismissed
when the trial court granted an order of absolution from the instance. This
order was confirmed by the SCA and the applicant appealed to the constitu-
tional court.
The applicant based her application on the argument that the relevant mem-
bers of the police and the public prosecutors owed her a duty to ensure that she
enjoyed her constitutional rights to life, respect for and protection of her
dignity, freedom and security, personal privacy and freedom of movement.
Counsel argued that the trial court and the SCA erred in not developing the
common law, because such development would have resulted in a finding that
the respondents owed a legal duty to protect these rights. Neither the trial court
nor the SCA had regard to the relevant provisions of the constitution, because
91
As will appear from the discussion below, this process affects public as well as private law. In
fact the decision in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA; In Re: Ex Parte
Application of President of the RSA 2000 1 SA 674 (CC) par 44 is a good example of how the
common law of judicial review can be developed in accordance with new constitutional
provisions.
92
I leave the formulation vague on purpose. As will appear from the discussion of German theory
below the influence on legislation and the common law (''normal law'' in the German
terminology, referring to all non-constitutional law) can emanate from explicit constitutional
provisions (in or outside the bill of rights), general constitutional principles or so-called
``objective'' constitutional values.
93
2001 4 SA 938 (CC). For discussions of this decision see the sources cited in n 21 above, and
particularly Van der Walt ``Horisontal application'' (n 36) 517-540. Apart from Modder East
Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; President of the Republic of South Africa v
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 8 BCLR 821 (SCA) other cases in which the duty to
protect-construction was referred to are Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002
6 SA 431 (SCA); Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security (Women's Legal Centre Trust as
amicus curiae) 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA); Minister of Safety and Security v Hamilton 2004 2 SA 216
(SCA); Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 3 SA 305 (SCA).
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they simply held that no such duty existed at common law and therefore
granted absolution from the instance.
94
In its decision the constitutional court reiterated that the constitution is the
supreme law and that the bill of rights applies to all law. The constitution
grants all courts the inherent power to develop the common law, and places
an obligation upon the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the funda-
mental rights. The constitution also binds the judiciary and provides that the
courts must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the bill of rights when
developing the common law. Accordingly, when the common law deviates
from the spirit, purport and object of the bill of rights the courts are obliged
to develop it ``by removing that deviation''.
95
The decision thus relies on the
language and logic of indirect horisontal application (or development of the
common law in terms of section 39(2)) thinking as well as state duty to protect
(in terns of section 7(2)) thinking.
The applicant's case was that the common law with regard to wrongfulness
should be developed beyond existing precedent. Neither the trial court nor the
SCA embarked upon the required inquiry for such a development.
96
The start-
ing point is the fact that section 8(1) imposes a duty upon the state and all its
organs not to perform any act that infringes the rights protected in the bill of
rights. In this regard, the constitutional court adopted a dictum of the Eur-
opean court of human rights in which it was said that the entrenchment of the
right to life in the European Convention may imply in certain well-defined
circumstances a positive obligation on the state to take preventive operational
measures to protect an individual whose life is threatened by the criminal acts
of another individual.
97
In view of these considerations, and considering the
different options for developing the common law that presented themselves in
this matter, the constitutional court decided that the case for the appellant had
sufficient merit to require careful consideration of the complex legal matters
raised in it, and that the matter should therefore be referred back to the trial
court to continue with the trial.
98
Upon reconsideration the trial court ac-
knowledged that it had erred in not considering the constitutional effect on
the case, and decided that there was a gap between the common law (which
would not have placed a duty upon the state) and the fundamental rights in the
constitution (which would place a duty to protect upon the state), and that the
94
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001
4 SA 938 (CC) par 32 953C-D. See Van der Walt ``Horisontal application'' (n 36) 517-540, who
argues that the problematic aspect of the common law that had to be developed was the rules of
civil procedure that allowed a court to grant absolution from the instance before it can be forced
to decide whether a new remedy has to be created or developed in view of the constitution.
95
as set out by Ackermann and Goldstone JJ par 33 953E-954A.
96
Par 40 956A-C.
97
par 45 958B-C, with reference to Osman v United Kingdom 29 EHHR 245 par 115 305 (also
reported as 1998 ECHR 101). In par 48 959F the court also referred to Z v United Kingdom
application no 29392/95, 10 May 2001 (reported as 2001 ECHR 329).
98
Par 81-83 970H-971E.
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common law therefore had to be developed in view of section 39(2) of the
constitution to place a duty upon the state. The trial court therefore granted
an action for damages to the plaintiff.
99
One argument that supports the applicant's claim on the basis of the state's
duty to protect is therefore that the constitution places an obligation upon all
state organs not to infringe upon the entrenched rights of individuals. In addi-
tion, the courts are obliged to develop the common law so as to protect,
promote and fulfil those rights; and that implies a further obligation upon
the state to take preventive measures Ð in certain well-defined circumstances
Ð to ensure that other individuals do not infringe upon the entrenched rights
of private persons. The remarks to the same effect in theModderklip case
100
are
therefore not plucked out of thin air Ð they form part of a larger shift in South
African constitutional theory towards the notion of the state's duty to protect
private persons against infringements of their fundamental rights by unlawful
conduct of other private persons.
3.4 Developing the common law according to constitutional demands
The question for decision in Carmichele was whether the common law of delict
indeed should have been developed to recognise a duty of care that would have
rendered the state liable for failure to protect the applicant from unlawful
attacks by another private person. The trial court initially argued Ð purely
with reference to the common law and without taking the constitution into
account Ð that private law did not recognise such a duty of care. In turning
down the appeal against the original decision of the trial court, the SCA agreed
that the common law as it stood at the beginning of this saga did not render the
state liable Ð a position that prominent academics apparently shared.
101
Other
academics disagreed, arguing that the common law of delict could indeed
accommodate the view that the state owed its citizens a duty of care against
unlawful actions of other private persons, and that the real problem with the
99
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 2 SA 656 (C). See Van der Walt ``Horisontal
application'' (n 36) 517-540 for criticism of the decision, arguing that the problem was not the
gap between the common law of delict and the fundamental rights, but between the civil law of
procedure and the fundamental rights.
100
SeeModder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; President of the Republic of South
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 8 BCLR 821 (SCA). On appeal the constitutional
court upheld the SCA order, on different grounds, without referring to the duty to protect
argument at all: President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd case
CCT 20/04 2005-05-13 (CC). In this case the CC relied on the duty of the state to ensure access
to the courts, including efficient and suitable enforcement of court orders, based on s 34 of the
constitution. The case is discussed below.
101
See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 1 SA 489 (SCA). Neethling ``Die regsplig
van die staat om die reg op die fisies-psigiese integriteit teen derdes te beskerm: Die korrekte
benadering tot onregmatigheid, nalatigheid en feitelike kousaliteit'' 2001 THRHR 489-495
agreed that this was the correct approach and result.
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common law lay elsewhere.
102
The constitutional court did not decide the issue
Ð it was referred back to the trial court for reconsideration with due regard for
the applicable principles and values of the constitution Ð but suggested
strongly that there was a need for development of the common law. The trial
judge decided, upon reconsideration, that he had indeed not taken the effect of
the constitution into consideration originally, and that the common law indeed
required such development to make the state liable, and therefore he reversed
his own earlier decision.
103
It therefore seems fair to conclude that there is little or no agreement about
the question whether the South African common law requires judicial deve-
lopment in order for it to accommodate the apparently widely recognised need
to construe a duty of the state to protect private citizens from attacks on their
physical integrity by other private persons. Subsequent to the strong hints by
the constitutional court everybody seems to agree that it is justified and neces-
sary that such a duty should exist and that it should in suitable cases render the
state liable in delict for inaction, but there is a wide difference of opinion about
the mechanics for realising this development. Some think the common law can
accommodate such a duty of care without constitutionally inspired develop-
ment; others think the duty of care should be recognised but private law
requires development for that purpose. Judging from case law and academic
reaction, it seems fair to argue that the need to recognise the duty of care would
probably not have been recognised so widely and unanimously in the absence
of the constitutional court decision in Carmichele. Left purely to its own de-
vices, private law would possibly not have made this development at all, or at
least not have made it so soon or as comprehensively as it has now been made
in the aftermath of Carmichele. That must cast some doubt upon the approach
according to which the development of private law should take place as an
interstitial development or a dogmatic change of direction within and accord-
ing to the logic of private law Ð the initial nudge from the constitutional court
seems to have been inspirational and instrumental in this case to say the least.
In view of the legal certainty that is at stake in developing the common law one
should not be surprised by the hesitance of some courts Ð the decision to
102
Van der Walt argued in ``Horisontal application'' (n 36) that there was not a fundamental gap
between the common law of delict and the fundamental rights embodied in the constitution,
and that it was the common law of civil procedure that required development in view of
constitutional principles so as to avoid instances (such as Carmichele) where courts grant
absolution from the instance too easily and so never get to the point where the possible effect of
the constitution on private law can be considered properly. It is interesting that the trial judge
reconsidered and reversed his view so readily and radically upon consideration of the
constitutional issues, while others seem to react more guardedly. Having described the SCA
decision in Carmichele as correct, Neethling (with Potgieter) ``Toepassing van die grondwet op
die deliktereg'' 2002 THRHR 265-273 does not seem ready or eager to accept that the common
law of delict required fundamental development or adaptation in view of the CC decision, and
focuses strongly on the aspects of the CC decision that emphasise the limited powers of the
courts in changing the common law. Although Neethling and Potgieter accept that the law of
delict is now clearly co-determined by constitutional principles and values, they emphasise that
it does not give judges carte blanche to change the common law dramatically or at will. See
further Neethling and Potgieter ``Die regsplig van die staat om die reg op fisiese integriteit teen
aantasting deur derdes te beskerm: Twee teenstrydige beslissings'' 2002 THRHR 273-278.
103
Chetty J in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 2 SA 656 (C). See Van der Walt
``Horisontal application'' (n 36) 517-540 for a critical discussion of what he refers to as ``a
startling reversal''.
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uphold and stabilise or to change and develop the common law cannot be
made in the abstract; it is a difficult and complex decision that has to be
made in every individual case with due regard for the context and the implica-
tions of the decision.
104
It therefore remains very important to keep debating
the question whether (and when) developments can be left to the ``normal''
dogmatic processes of private law as a living system and when constitutional
inspiration and impetus are required for (and need to be recognised as) the
origin and indicator of the pace and scope of such development.
Important as this decision is, it should not be made purely on the basis of
duty to protect arguments. The approach according to which the common law
has to be developed in accordance with the constitution Ð in effect the hor-
isontal application approach stated in other terms Ð is not completely dead,
nor is its relevance restricted to the law of delict as it once may have appeared.
In a recent property-related decision
105
the constitutional court comprehen-
sively set out the constitutional framework within which the development of
the common law has to take place as far as evictions are concerned. The case
concerned a group of people who settled upon private land unlawfully and who
are now threatened with eviction by the local government, acting on behalf of
the private landowners. In such a case, the court explained,
106
eviction laws
``cannot simply be looked at as a legislative mechanism designed to restore
common law property rights by freeing them of racist and authoritarian provi-
sions, though that is one of its aspects''; they had to be understood and applied
``within a defined and carefully calibrated constitutional matrix.'' This matrix
is defined by what the court refers to as a ``transformatory public-law view of
the Constitution'', which requires the establishment of an appropriate consti-
tutional relationship between section 25 (property rights) and section 26 (hous-
ing rights), with due regard for the historical context of land hunger and
evictions from land in the apartheid era, the role of the constitution in reform-
ing the injustices of the past and the constitutional values of human dignity,
equality and freedom.
107
Approached within this interpretive contextual frame-
work or ``matrix'', the salient features of the way in which the constitution
104
See Roux (n 72) 466-492 for a carefully considered and argued perspective.
105
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC). A similar approach was
followed in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). In the latter case, the
constitutional court decided to develop the law pertaining to the sale in execution of property,
especially immovable property that serves as the debtor's house, to satisfy a debt. The court
took the historical and socio-economic context and the importance of security of tenure in
housing into account and decided that any measure which permits a person to be deprived of
existing access to adequate housing limits the rights protected in s 26(3) of the constitution: par
34. However, the court also held that a blanket prohibition of sale in execution of housing stock
would not take the interests of creditors into account, and accordingly it decided to develop the
institution of judicial oversight and to charge magistrates with the duty to ensure that sales in
execution will not unreasonably and unjustly deprive indigent persons of their existing access to
adequate housing. To discharge this duty, magistrates will have to take into account factors
such as the circumstances in which the debt was incurred, attempts by the debtor to pay off the
debt, the financial situation of the parties, the amount of the debt, whether the debtor is
employed or has a source of income to pay off the debt, and any other relevant factor: par 55-
60. To enable the courts to exercise this discretion the court chose to read a suitable phrase into
s 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944: par 64.
106
par 4-13, but especially 14-23. A very similar approach to transformation is set out in a
newspaper article by Cape high court judge Davis: ``Let law take its course'' The Sunday Times
(SA) [18-10-2004] http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/.
107
par 10, 15, 17, 19.
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approaches the interrelationship between land hunger, homelessness and re-
spect for property rights are that: (a) the rights of the dispossessed are not
generally stated in unqualified terms; (b) eviction of people living in informal
settlements may take place, even if that means that they lose their home; and
(c) section 26(3) places emphasis on the need to seek concrete, case-specific
solutions that require the courts to consider all relevant circumstances:
``'The judicial function in these circumstances is not to establish a hierarchical arrangement
between the different interests involved, privileging in an abstract and mechanical way the rights
of ownership over the right not to be dispossessed of a home, or vice versa. Rather it is to
balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as possible taking account of
all the interests involved and the specific factors relevant in each particular case.''
108
Moreover, in a thinly veiled reference to the minimalist stance adopted by the
SCA in Brisley v Drotsky,
109
the court added that the courts have ``a very wide
mandate'' and ``the widest discretion possible''
110
in taking account of all the
relevant circumstances in eviction proceedings. In other words, the rather me-
chanical eviction reflex of the common law is developed, taking into account
the historical context and the transformative matrix of the new constitution
within which the eviction laws must be interpreted and applied, so as to allow
the courts the widest possible discretion to consider all relevant circumstances
before deciding whether an eviction is justified in a particular case. This result
can only be described as an example of the indirect horisontal application of
the fundamental right in section 26 of the constitution, by which the common
law is developed and changed in such a way as to move away from the history
of inequality and injustice and towards a new dispensation of justice, equality
and human dignity.
3.5 The state's duty to protect versus the state's duty of care
A second question arising from Carmichele seems not to have enjoyed aca-
demic or judicial attention to date, namely what the exact nature and scope of
the duty construed in this decision is and how it relates to the idea of deve-
loping the common law in accordance with the constitution. Did Carmichele
extend the private law doctrine of the duty of care and the claim for damages
that goes with it, or did it construe a general constitutional duty upon the state
to protect citizens' fundamental rights? What are the differences between these
two constructions, if any? Does it matter whether we approach the issue from
one rather than the other direction?
On the one hand it looks as if the explicit provisions of the constitution are
the origin of the state's duty to protect as it was formulated in Carmichele and
other cases. Section 7(2) of the constitution enjoins the state to ``respect, pro-
tect, promote, and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights'', and it seems natural to
deduce from that provision that the state has a constitutional duty to promote
and protect rights. The constitutional court went further in Carmichele, adding
that the South African constitution ``is not merely a formal document regulat-
ing public power'', and that it, like the German Basic Law, ``also embodies . . .
an objective, normative value system'', and that development of the common
108
par 23; see further par 20, 21, 22.
109
2002 4 SA 1 (SCA); see particularly par 42, 43 21A-F.
110
Port Elizabeth v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) par 30 and 45 respectively.
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law in terms of section 39(2) of the constitution must take place ``within the
matrix of this objective normative value system''.
111
This, according to the
constitutional court, requires development that meets the constitutional objec-
tives of section 39(2) as well as the requirements of developing the common law
within its own paradigm.
112
A link is therefore established between the state's
duty to protect the fundamental rights in terms of section 7(2) and the obliga-
tion to develop the common law according to section 39(2).
In referring to the objective value system inherent in the fundamental rights
and the effect of this system of objective normative values the constitutional
court signaled how far it has moved away from discussing the effect of the
constitution on private law in terms of horisontal application Ð the focus now
seems to be upon the state's duty to protect private individuals and their
constitutional rights against infringements by unlawful conduct of other indi-
viduals, in view of the explicit provisions of the constitution or of the objective
normative values underlying or embedded in the fundamental rights. However,
in discussing this development no mention is made of the horisontal applica-
tion of the rights in the constitution (such as physical integrity). In making this
move from horisontal application discourse to duty to protect discourse, the
South African courts followed a line of development that resembles a similar
development in German constitutional law,
113
but strangely enough German
authorities and the well-developed German theory on this point played almost
no part in the South African development at all.
In the Carmichele case,
114
the constitutional court referred to case law from
the US (against ``positive rights'')
115
and from the European court of human
rights (in favour of state liability)
116
to substantiate its suggestion that the state
(in the form of public bodies such as the police) could be liable to delictual
actions from members of the public who claim that the state has failed to
protect them against violations of their fundamental rights, even in situations
where the actual harm was done by another private person. Apart from the
rather general statement about the objective normative values in the constitu-
tion referred to above,
117
no reference was made to German law in Carmichele,
nor did Ackermann J refer to the German doctrine regarding the state duty to
111
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening)
2001 4 SA 938 (CC) par 54 961F-H.
112
Par 55 962B.
113
The German theory is discussed in part 2 of this article.
114
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening)
2001 4 SA 938 (CC) par 45-49 957F-960B.
115
De Shaney v Winnebago County Department of Social Services 489 US 189 (1988). The case was
cited merely to make the point that the state action doctrine precludes state liability in the
absence of state action in contravention of a fundamental right, and that the US supreme court
works from the baseline position that there are no positive rights in the US constitution; see
Carmichele par 45 957H.
116
Osman v United Kingdom 29 EHHR 245 1998 ECHR 101; Z v United Kingdom 2001 ECHR 329.
These cases were cited to demonstrate the court's rejection of the immunity approach that is
followed in the UK to safeguard public authorities against delictual claims by members of the
public: Carmichele par 46 958D.
117
Carmichele par 54 961F-H.
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protect in his extensive analysis of German law in Du Plessis v De Klerk.
118
German law was not referred to in the subsequent delict decisions that followed
the Carmichele decision either.
119
In subsequent decisions where the facts did
not resemble Carmichele or the other delictual cases, the courts relied indirectly
upon the Carmichele decision and the notion of the state's duty to protect
rights, but referred only to international law sources (mostly a different set
of international law cases than were referred to earlier).
120
As a consequence,
there is considerable lack of clarity about the nature of the shift to duty to
protect discourse and about the authority for that shift. It is not clear how this
shift affects the existing position with regard to horisontal application either;
does that whole debate and everything that was said about radiation now play
no role any more? In order to evaluate the authorities referred to in the case
law since Carmichele I therefore analyse German and international law with
regard to the state's duty to protect fundamental rights in sections 4 and 5
below.
Interestingly, the Carmichele argument based on the state's duty to protect
the fundamental rights of its citizens was recently relied on in a supreme court
of appeal decision that had nothing to do with the state's delictual liability,
although the order eventually granted included a compensation element. The
Modderklip case concerned a situation where a landowner was unable to en-
force an eviction order against a community of unlawful occupiers on his land
because they had nowhere else to go.
121
In Modderklip the supreme court of
appeal once again relied on the duty to protect argument, deciding that the
state was responsible for the impasse in enforcing the landowner's property
interests: because the state was not honouring its duty to realise and fulfill the
occupiers' constitutional right to access to housing they had no alternative
accommodation, and until such accommodation was provided the landowner
would be unable to enforce his eviction order. The state was therefore in-
structed to provide alternative housing for the unlawful occupiers, and the
owner was allowed to claim damages from the state for as long as the occupiers
118
In Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC) Ackermann J dedicated the entire 5 pages of
his analysis of German law (par 92-106 at 704F-709E) to a detailed consideration of the reasons
why the German courts and scholars rejected (and why South African courts should also reject)
direct horisontal application and instead work with indirect horisontal application only.
119
Other cases in which the duty to protect-construction was referred to are Minister of Safety and
Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA); Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security
(Women's Legal Centre Trust as amicus curiae) 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA); Minister of Safety and
Security v Hamilton 2004 2 SA 216 (SCA); Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 3
SA 305 (SCA). Like Carmichele, these decisions focused on the liability of the state or public
bodies for delictual claims from members of the public in terms of the private law duty of care
doctrine, equating an extension or development of the common law that would render the state
liable with state accountability. In Van Duivenboden the SCA referred to Osman v Ferguson
1993 4 All ER 344 (CA); Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHHR 245, 1998 ECHR 101 and
Jane Doe v Board of Commissioners of Police for Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto et al
(1990) 72 DLR (4th) 580 (Ont CA). The other cases referred to Carmichele but not to foreign or
international law.
120
especially the different Modderklip decisions; see n 122 below for references.
121
Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; President of the Republic of South
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 8 BCLR 821 (SCA).
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were still present on his land. In making this order the supreme court of appeal
relied on the case law and literature surrounding the General Comments of the
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
122
This approach to
the duty to protect argument is particularly relevant to the South African
situation because section 7(2) of the constitution provides explicitly that
``[t]he state must respect, protect, promote, and fulfill the rights in the Bill of
Rights.'' It is therefore not surprising that the international law cases in which
this approach was developed are cited as authority in Modderklip for the
proposition that the state has a duty to respect, protect and fulfil the section
25 and 26 rights in the South African constitution. Interestingly, the constitu-
tional court managed on appeal to uphold the supreme court of appeal's order,
without referring to the argument that the state has a duty to protect its
citizens' rights at all. This conclusion was reached by relying on section 34
of the constitution, arguing that it was unreasonable for the state to stand by
and do nothing in circumstances where a citizen was practically incapable of
enforcing his rights because of the sheer magnitude of the land invasion and the
particular circumstances of the occupiers. In such a situation, the constitu-
tional court argued, the state has a duty (as part of their section 34 obligation
to provide the necessary institutions and mechanisms to ensure access to the
courts) to assist the landowner in enforcing his rights. This argument was made
without any mention of section 7(2) or the general notion of a state duty to
protect the rights of its citizens against unlawful interference.
123
In the Metrorail case,
124
the constitutional court followed a slightly different
line of argument in deciding whether a public company (in which the state is
the only shareholder) is accountable to its customers (commuters using the
railway service provided by the company) for crimes committed against them
by other passengers. The court argued that the company was a state organ that
bore certain obligations in terms of the Legal Succession to the South African
Transport Services Act 8 of 1989; that these obligations had to be interpreted in
the light of the bill of rights because the company was accountable to the
broader community in the exercise of its powers; and that the statutory provi-
sions that gave rise to the company's powers and accountability had to be
interpreted in view of the relevant constitutional provisions and with due re-
gard for the social, economic and political context within which the powers of
122
Instead of the delictual duty of care cases referred to in Carmichele, the court in Modderklip
referred to another set of cases relating to the state's duty to protect, fulfil, promote and realise
citizens' constitutional rights: X and Y v The Netherlands 1985 8 EHRR 235 (European court of
human rights, European convention on human rights); Union des Jeunes Avocats v Chad 9th
Annual Activity Report 72 (African Commission, African Charter of human and peoples'
rights); The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social
Rights v Nigeria 15th Annual Activity Report 30 (African Commission, African Charter of
human and peoples' rights); Vela
Á
squez Rodriguez v Honduras 28 ILM 291 (1989) (Inter-
American court of human rights). See further on this literature Liebenberg ``The interpretation
of socio-economic rights'' in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed
original service 2003) 33-6±33-7. These cases and the relevant development are discussed in part
2 5 of the article .
123
President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd case CCT 20/04 13-
05-2005 (CC) par 48. For a discussion of the Modderklip cases see Van der Walt ``The state's
duty to protect property owners vs the state's duty to provide housing: Thoughts on the
Modderklip case'' forthcoming 2005 SAJHR.
124
Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet t/a Metrorail 2005 2 SA 359 (CC) par 69-83 397H-
402I.
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the company were exercised, to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the
bill of rights. Accordingly, the company bore a positive obligation, arising
from the authorising statute read with the constitution, to ensure that reason-
able measures were in place to provide for the security of rail commuters.
125
In
coming to this decision the court relied on the provisions in sections 7, 8 and 39
of the constitution and not on foreign case law, although the Osman decision
that was applied in Carmichele was again referred to.
126
In the relevant pas-
sage, the court confirmed that the effect of the Carmichele decision was to
establish that accountability of a public power was one of the considerations
that was relevant to the question of whether a legal duty exists for purposes of
the law of delict;
127
thereby clarifying the proper relationship between the
public law theory of a state duty to protect and the private law doctrine of
the duty of care, and (possibly) liability for a claim for delictual damages. The
most important aspect of this finding is the fact that the existence of a state
duty to protect (accountability) can be an indication of a duty of care and
hence of private law liability, so that private law could possibly be developed
(in the sense that state liability is extended) to give effect to a transformative,
public law or constitutional notion of accountability.
The approach in the Metrorail case is significant for this article, in that it
signifies a clear move away from the earlier debate about (direct or indirect)
horisontal application, while at the same time leaving us in some doubt about
the future direction of the debate about the effect of the constitution on private
law. On the one hand, the court still refers to and relies upon the new discourse,
opened up in Carmichele and similar earlier cases, about the state's duty to
protect its citizens' fundamental rights against infringements by other private
parties, but without bringing final clarity about the theoretical foundation for
this discourse. On the other hand the court also relies, in passages that are
easier to follow as far as their constitutional and theoretical foundations are
concerned, upon the constitutional duty of the courts to develop existing law to
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the constitution according to section
39(2) of the constitution.
The possible sources of comparative authority for the notion of a state duty
to protect fundamental rights are discussed in the next sections of the article,
followed by an evaluation.
[to be concluded in 2006:1 TSAR]
125
par 85 403E-G. It was unnecessary to decide whether this was a direct constitutional obligation
because reliance was placed primarily on the statutory obligations of the company. The court
added that the obligation to ensure the safety of rail commuters could not be placed exclusively
on the shoulders of the police, because they were operating under severe capacity restraints;
once it was clear that the police could not manage to ensure safety on their own the company
had the obligation to take reasonable steps to ensure that rail commuter passengers were safe:
par 91-93 405G-H, 406D-F.
126
See par 71-73 398E-399F, particularly 399A-B and n 77 there.
127
par 73 399D-F. The court pointed out that it would not always be necessary or suitable to
award delictual damages for a particular breach of a duty to protect citizens' fundamental
rights and that other public law remedies (particularly declaratory, mandatory and prohibitory
relief) would sometimes be more suitable: par 79 401F.
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